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Executive summary of findings and recommendations 
The main question addressed in this study is the performance of the labour markets in the 
Western Balkans. The aim was to find out whether they can deliver growth of employment 
and decline of unemployment in the medium run and whether they can withstand short-
term shocks due to changes in demand or supply.  
The main shock in transition is that of productivity. Indeed, in this region, as in more 
advanced countries in transition, productivity growth is the main source of GDP growth. 
With employment stagnant or falling and recovering only in one or two cases, inflationary 
pressures should be quite moderate.  
Labour market disequilibria seem to be mostly structural and connected with the 
characteristics of the process of transition. That means that low employment, high 
unemployment and market segmentation (i.e., a high share of informal employment) are 
not primarily the consequence of the wage setting process and practices. That is not to say 
that the flexibility of wages is not important for short-term adjustment, but medium-term 
developments are more subject to the change of structural factors. 
Short-term risks are as a rule connected with the external balances. High trade and current 
account deficits make these countries vulnerable to short-term reversals in financial flows. 
These risks have been increasing recently due to unfavourable external developments and 
slow policy reaction in the countries in the region.  
In the medium run, macroeconomic balances may prove to be sustainable if there are 
improvements in labour market outcomes. That will mostly depend on economic growth 
being strong and sustained and on the appropriate labour market policies. 
We do observe significant imbalances in labour markets, overall and for particular groups 
and sectors, but most of the tests of flexibility that we performed do not indicate undue 
wage rigidity. It is possible that the level of wages is too high, as external deficits would 
suggest, but alternative explanations are also possible.  
The exercise which aimed to determine whether wages are misbehaved with respect to 
productivity developments does not turn out strong evidence. There are certain indications 
that public sector wages are higher than they should be, but the evidence is not strong. It 
may still be the case that wages are too high, but strong productivity growth would indicate 
that even in that case the misalignment is disappearing.  
The study of the effects of labour market protection legislation does not indicate that one 
could expect a strong labour market response to the relaxation of labour protection. 
However, there are important effects of temporary employment restrictions and especially 
so for female employment. A more detailed study, which in most cases has not been 
possible due to data limitations, could unearth similar negative effects of various labour 
market regulations on specific segments of that market. 8 
We also note that there is an important role that informal markets play, but further study is 
needed to determine their precise role in absorbing employment and in wage setting. 
Existing data enable only the indirect study of these markets because they are not well 
tracked by official statistics due to their very nature. Also, informality is not easily defined 
because it is not always precisely distinguished from formal markets. It is a rather 
widespread practice in the region to combine formal with informal employment, and the 
effects on wages and labour market outcomes are complex and hard to predict. 
The importance of the informal markets should not be exaggerated, except in Albania and 
Kosovo, if formal markets serve as leaders in terms of wage setting and security of 
employment. This seems to be the case once there is steady growth of the private sector, 
of industrial production and of GDP as a whole. Of course, in the services sector and in 
construction, informality is widespread and these sectors are certainly important in these 
countries. However, the macroeconomic effect cannot be negative, because it cannot be 
expected that wages will tend to eat into profits too much in the informal sector. The effects 
on the labour market can be different and more data and analysis is needed to say 
something more definite on that. 
The Balkans is a migrant region and there is significant dependence on remittances both to 
sustain consumption and to support macroeconomic stability. This study finds that there is 
also growing intra-regional migration, which can be expected to continue in the future. 
There is no strong evidence that either outward migration or the flows of remittances are 
dependent on business cycles. Rather it seems that external labour markets play a 
constant and important role in labour decisions in the Balkans. 
Detailed country-by-country recommendations can be found in the text. Here we 
summarize them for the whole region. 
On the side of demand for labour, the key reforms have to do more with the product than 
with the labour markets themselves. Those include: 
–  increased flexibility in the product market to support entrepreneurship; 
–  stronger implementation of competition policies in order to eliminate monopolies and 
other distortions; support new entrants; 
–  support to the recovery of industrial production; 
–  rebalance the relative weights of public vs. private sector employment. 
On the side of labour supply, the main problems are where there is the highest 
unemployment. That is connected with skills, regional differences, distorted legislation and 
informality:  
–  invest in skill acquisition, 
–  especially in vocational training to address youth unemployment; 
–  address the issue of low employment rates of women 9 
–  remove barriers to mobility to address regional pockets of high unemployment; 
–  adjust fiscal policy and improve public service to address incentives for informal 
employment. 
When it comes to flexibility of wages, the key recommendations have to do with the 
desirability and the modality of incomes policy. This has been discussed in the text. In 
general, it can be advised that: 
–  incomes policy should supplement monetary policy; in some cases social partnership 
is the answer, in others a cap on public sector wages is appropriate; 
–  public sector reforms are needed in most countries, i.e. employment in the public 
sector should decline further (reduces the role of wage-setting leadership of public sector 
workers); 
–  social security reforms, in particular pension reforms, should be a priority in all 
countries. 
Overall, as long as high growth rates can be sustained, the reforms here recommended 
should not be too hard to implement and they should in turn contribute to the sustainability 
of growth and labour market improvements. Short-term risks should be addressed by other 
policy instruments. Clearly, there will be other challenges going forward and the flexibility of 
policy response will continue to be crucial.  
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Adjustment capacity to external shocks of EU candidate and potential EU 
candidate countries of the Western Balkans, with a focus on labour markets 
1    Survey of the literature on the adjustment capacity to external 
shocks of EU candidate and potential candidate countries of the 
Western Balkans, with a focus on labour markets 
1.1   Introduction 
The literature on labour market adjustments to shocks is vast. Even the literature that deals 
only with the European Union or with the economies in transition is very large. By contrast, 
studies focusing on the Western Balkans are rare. This is due to lack of data, but also to 
the many specific factors that interfere so that the effects that are of interest are rather 
difficult to detect. When it comes to investigating labour markets in the Western Balkans, 
wiiw can rely very much on the previous work done at the institute. 
 
The bulk of the literature survey is devoted to studies on all the pertinent factors that may 
influence labour market flexibility and thus its ability to adjust to shocks relatively quickly. 
Wage and employment flexibility is much more important in the Western Balkans because 
these countries rely mostly on fixed exchange rates and thus aim at nominal stability. 
Shocks are therefore transmitted immediately to the labour markets. In order to assess the 
latter’s capacity to adjust, the literature on wage flexibility, labour mobility, structural 
characteristics, wage setting, skill mismatches and on labour institutions is surveyed 
extensively. That leads to the identification of the factors that have been found to be 
important for labour market flexibility. The survey also serves as a guide to the theories and 
methods that can be used in this project to answer specific questions.  
 
1.2   The adjustment capability of the labour markets to shocks in the context 
of transition 
1.2.1  Adjustment mechanisms in transition countries 
1.2.1.1 Wage  flexibility 
Economic literature (Boeri et al., 1998; Blanchflower, 2001) argues that wage flexibility is a 
key determinant of labour market flexibility. One mechanism to accommodate shocks (to 
labour supply, demand, or productivity) is the adjustment of wages. Wage flexibility in the 
Central and Eastern European transition countries has been explored by means of time 
series analytical methods. This research finds that the ability of labour markets to adjust in 
the presence of shocks is insufficient. Studying the responsiveness of nominal and real 
wages to shocks in four Western EU  members as well as the Visegrád countries (the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia) in a two-equation SVAR framework, 
Moore and Pentecost (2006) find that among the new EU members, only Hungary and the 
Czech Republic are well-prepared for EMU membership in terms of labour market 
adjustment. Babetskii (2006) compares eight new EU member states, four of which are 11 
participants of the second level of the Exchange Rate Mechanism, as well as three 
eurozone members for comparison, to explore how far wages can flexibly accommodate 
macroeconomic shocks. He does not find supportive evidence for a higher adjustment 
capability of labour markets in the ERM-2 participant countries or the members of the 
eurozone.  
 
The regional dimension of wage adjustment has become a popular subject of study in the 
past decades. The adjustment of wages at the regional level is a mechanism to eliminate 
unemployment disparities across regions. If wages are sufficiently flexible, they should fall 
in regions with high unemployment. Low wages in turn support the creation of new jobs on 
the one hand, and may act as a push factor for the outflow of workers from the region on 
the other. A conventional framework for investigating the flexibility of wages is provided by 
the wage curve as popularized by Blanchflower and Oswald (1994). The wage curve 
relates the regional average wage on the left-hand side to unemployment and a number of 
control variables, including regional fixed effects. Blanchflower and Oswald (1994) have 
claimed that the unemployment elasticity of pay is a stable coefficient in various country 
samples, around -0.1. This empirical regularity has not been reproduced in subsequent 
work, though. In a meta-analytic assessment, Nijkamp and Poot (2005) argue that 
considering publication bias and correcting for hours of work effects, the mean estimate of 
the unemployment elasticity of pay in advanced economies is about -0.05.  
 
The elasticity of regional pay with respect to unemployment in the Central and East 
European (CEE) countries has been investigated in a number of contributions. The overall 
conclusion of this research is that there is substantial heterogeneity across countries as 
concerns the responsiveness of earnings to local labour market conditions. The individual 
country studies using micro data find wage elasticities ranging from -0.09 for Hungary in 
1992 to -0.53 for Eastern Germany (Puhani, 1997; Pannenberg and Schwarze, 1998; 
Kertesi and Köllö, 1999; Duffy and Walsh, 2001; Elhorst et al., 2002; Ilkkaracan and Selim, 
2003). The corresponding elasticities obtained using regional data are in the range of -0.09 
for Hungary to -0.8 for Poland (Kállai and Traistaru, 1998; Duffy and Walsh, 2001; Huitfeld, 
2001; Iara and Traistaru, 2004). Blanchflower (2001), in a research paper covering nine 
CEE countries with micro data, finds unemployment elasticities of pay between 0.003 for 
the Czech Republic to -0.52 for Latvia. Von Hagen and Traistaru (2006) observe positive 
elasticities of pay for Cyprus, Malta and Slovenia (joint estimate of 0.55) as well as for 
Hungary (0.15), a comparatively low negative coefficient for the Slovak Republic (-0.06) 
and a high elasticity in the Baltics (-0.15). They find no wage curve in Poland and the 
Czech Republic. In a comprehensive recent study with regional aggregate data, Buettner 
(2007) estimates country-specific wage curves for six new EU member states, Romania 
and Bulgaria as well as for five EU-15 members for comparison. For the CEE countries, he 
reports elasticities of pay ranging between 0.01 in Slovenia and -0.09 in Hungary. Besides, 12 
he provides quantitative evidence that wages are more responsive to local labour market 
conditions in the CEE countries than in the old EU members.  
 
A positive coefficient to the unemployment rate is not in line with the models proposed by 
Blanchflower and Oswald (1994) to explain the wage curve. Apart from possibly insufficient 
and poor data, one explanation may be that unemployment is correlated with long-term 
unemployment, and its coefficient reflects the effect of long-term unemployment as well. 
Specifically, an increase in long-term unemployment implies a reduction of the labour 
supply, which can be expected to affect the wage level positively (Pekkarinen, 2001).  
 
Summing up, research results exploring the responsiveness of (real and nominal) wages to 
shocks in some of the new member countries are ambiguous. There is substantial 
heterogeneity across countries regarding the responsiveness of earnings to local labour 
market conditions. In general, wages in the new member states are more responsive to 
local labour market conditions than in the old member states.  
 
1.2.1.2  Worker and job flows (flexibility of labour supply and demand) 
The literature on labour reallocation in the CEE countries has been dominated by the 
preoccupation with worker flows across sectors and across labour market statuses in the 
course of transitional adjustment. In the first decade after transition, the CEE countries 
experienced large worker flows in the context of transition from central planning to a 
market economy. The following stylized facts have emerged (Boeri and Terrell, 2002; 
Rutkowski et al., 2005): First, industrial employment fell and employment in the services 
sector increased in all CEE countries. In addition, some countries experienced an increase 
of the employment share in agriculture in the initial period of transition – in particular 
Romania and Bulgaria, and to a lesser extent also Poland and Slovenia. Second, in the 
first years of transition, total employment fell to build up stocks of unemployment and 
non-participation in the labour force. The groups in the labour force especially affected by 
poor employment opportunities were women, labour market entrants, older workers, 
low-skilled workers, and workers living in rural areas. As compared to the EU-15, larger 
parts of the pools of unemployed were jobless for more than 12 months. Sizeable 
reductions of the labour force were supported by generous non-work benefits, such as 
early retirement schemes and disability pensions. In the later stage of transition, 
employment grew again, albeit at a lower pace than output, implying large labour 
productivity gains.  
 
Worker flows in the 1990s were part of the transition-related restructuring in the CEE 
countries. Has the process of transition-related worker reallocation come to an end? Cazes 
and Nesporova (2007) show that in the early 2000s, labour turnover in the CEE countries 
stabilized at levels around 20 to 35 per cent, while accession and separation rates typically 
converged. However, there are still important differences between labour market dynamics 13 
in the CEE countries and the Western European economies. Cazes and Nesporova (2007) 
also show that labour turnover was countercyclical in the CEE countries in the early 2000s, 
while it is typically pro-cyclical in the industrialized economies. They further elaborate that 
labour reallocation has responded to employment changes rather than to economic cycles, 
while the link between employment and economic fluctuations has been weak altogether. 
Looking at job instead of worker flows, Faggio and Konings (2003) similarly find that in the 
more advanced transition economies, the extent of job reallocation was comparable to that 
prevailing in Western countries in the second half of the 1990s already. In sum, labour 
market dynamics have clearly stabilized in the CEE countries in the second decade since 
1989. Yet, inspecting the relationship between job creation, unemployment and institutional 
variables on the one hand, and the dependence of long-term unemployment on past short-
term unemployment on the other, Faggio (2007) argues that the transition-related 
reallocation is still going on in the CEE countries.  
 
By making firing more costly, employment protection legislation (EPL) can be expected to 
reduce both dimensions of job reallocation, namely job creation and job destruction. The 
effect of EPL on job flows was examined in two recent contributions on the new EU 
member states. In particular, Cazes and Nesporova (2007) find from cross-country 
regressions that there is a significant negative relationship between the strictness of EPL 
and labour turnover. A more detailed examination of determinants of labour turnover with 
firm-level data covering several transition countries among others is Haltiwanger et al. 
(2006). This research shows that the negative effect of labour market regulations is 
especially relevant in industries with more frequent labour adjustment and for medium-
sized and large firms in particular, probably due to exemptions for small and medium-sized 
enterprises. As concerns the transition countries, they find that job reallocation rates have 
slowed down from around 30 per cent to somewhat lower levels typical of the EU-15 
countries, while heterogeneity across groups defined by industry and firm size also 
diminished to EU-15 levels.  
 
An important dimension in which persistent disequilibria can be observed in transition 
economies are the highly differentiated employment and unemployment rates for differently 
skilled persons on the labour market (for details see the 2004 study coordinated by the 
Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, European Commission, 2004; see also 
Landesmann and Vidovic, 2006). The differentiation in such rates, showing persistent 
mismatches between skill supplies and demands, are considerably higher than in Western 
Europe, and are a reflection of the necessarily slow and difficult adjustment processes of 
skill structures in the environment of strong sectoral and occupational structural changes in 
transition economies. The rather dramatic changes in skill demands at the sectoral, 
regional and occupational level is reflected also in the pronounced differences in 
employment rates by age cohorts and in different gender-skill combinations. 
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In summary, the first years of transition were characterized by dramatic changes in the 
sectoral composition of employment with high job losses in industry and agriculture, and 
increases in services sector jobs. These developments went along with high open 
unemployment and rising inactivity. Since the early 2000s labour market dynamics have 
clearly stabilized in the CEE countries. But in contrast to industrial economies where labour 
turnover is pro-cyclical, it was countercyclical in the CEE countries. Persistent disequilibria 
can still be found in the highly differentiated employment and unemployment rates for 
different skill groups.  
 
1.2.1.3  Regional and international labour mobility 
Regional labour mobility is one of the possible adjustment mechanisms of labour markets 
to reduce regional labour market imbalances that may arise from asymmetric demand 
shocks. In the context of the forthcoming EMU entry of the new EU entrants, several 
empirical contributions have scrutinized this mechanism in the CEE countries. The general 
conclusion of this research is that in the CEE countries, net labour migration is low by 
international standards and does not provide an effective contribution to the diminution of 
regional labour market disparities. The main insights of this research are as follows.  
 
Net regional migration in the Eastern European transition countries is lower than in the 
EU-15 and was declining in the 1990s, even if gross inter-regional migration was 
comparatively high at least in the Baltic countries. Regional wage and unemployment 
levels do have an impact on migration flows, but these are less responsive to regional 
labour market disparities than in the EU-15 countries (Paci et al., 2007; Huber, 2005; 
Fidrmuc, 2004; Hazans, 2003).  
 
Some studies have looked at the individual determinants of regional mobility in the Central 
and Eastern European transition countries (Paci et al., 2007; Fidrmuc and Huber, 2007; 
Hazans, 2003). These studies have found some evidence that regional mobility is 
increasing with education. Older individuals, women and spouses, and persons of minority 
ethnic origin (in the Baltics) are less likely to migrate. There are also sectoral differences in 
workers’ propensity to move: construction workers are more mobile while health and 
education workers are less so. Results are ambiguous as to whether or not unemployment 
affects the propensity to migrate. Home ownership reduces the willingness towards 
regional mobility.  
 
The above research on the transition countries shows that the inter-regional migration 
flows are too low to play a significant role as an adjustment mechanism in the presence of 
labour market imbalances. Instead, the re-equilibration of regional labour markets is found 
to take place via adjustments of labour force participation (Gács and Huber, 2005). The 
result that the less educated are less likely to move is particularly unfortunate as regards 15 
the role of migration for labour market adjustment, because the less skilled may be more 
vulnerable to shocks in the labour market. As concerns the reasons for low inter-regional 
mobility, there is suggestive evidence that this may be due to the importance of social 
networks for job search in the new EU member states (Paci et al., 2007). Besides, 
imperfections of housing markets and insufficient incentives for households with medium-
level incomes also play a role (Fidrmuc and Huber, 2007). Hegedûs (2003) argues for 
Hungary that serious barriers to inter-regional mobility are posed by the lack of rental 
housing and insufficient regulation of housing markets, as well as subsidies for home 
ownership. Finally, regional labour market imbalances may also be coupled with skill 
mismatches. The CEE transition countries are characterized by regional disparities of 
economic activity and productivity. Jobless workers with low skill levels from low-
productivity regions may not find a job upon the move to a high-productivity region with 
excess demand for workers with special skills (Köllô, 2003).  
 
Other than inter-regional mobility within one country, international mobility has gained 
importance in some CEE countries and in the Western Balkan countries in the past two 
decades. In former Yugoslavia, guest-worker emigration was already established in the 
1960s as a means to alleviate labour market imbalances. Among the new EU member 
states, important sending countries of migration are Poland, Latvia, Romania, and Bulgaria. 
According to official figures, 2.5 to 7 per cent of the working-age population of those 
countries were engaged in labour migration to other EU countries in 2007 (Iara et al., 2008). 
For the countries of the Western Balkans, population data show that in the 1990s, Albania 
as well as Bosnia and Herzegovina were the countries to suffer from the highest losses of 
population due to emigration, of 22 and 12 per cent of the total population respectively. In 
the same period, Croatia and Slovenia received 3 and 4 per cent of their population from 
immigration respectively. Net migration in this period was positive and small (1 per cent) in 
Serbia; that masks however large gross flows in both directions. Macedonia lost around 2 
per cent of its population in the 1990s because of emigration (Lucas, 2005).  
 
Across the Balkans, migrant workers’ remittances have become an important source of 
income. Officially recorded workers’ remittances accounted for up to 2 per cent of the GDP 
in the Visegrád countries and Slovenia, 2 to 4 per cent in the Baltic countries and 8 to 11 
per cent in the new EU members in 2007. Remittance levels have been relatively modest 
in Croatia and Macedonia, with 4 to 7 per cent of the GDP. In the region, among those 
countries for which data are available, Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina are heavily 
dependent on remittances that provided inflows of around 25-30 per cent of their GDP in 
2004 to 2006. For Slovakia, Serbia and Montenegro, no balance of payments data are 
available on remittances.  
Looking at the determinants of remittances, it is hypothesized, first, that remitting migrants 
may display altruism and support household consumption at home with their income 
abroad. Second, migrants may seek to accumulate savings to be invested at home. 16 
Besides, remittances may serve as insurance against negative income shocks to the family 
left behind in the home country. Empirical research on the Western Balkans provides 
supportive evidence for both the altruism and the insurance hypothesis: for the Western 
Balkan countries, Dragutinovic  Mitrovic and Jovicic (2006) find that remittances are 
determined by the level of unemployment, while output and wages in the home country do 
not play a role for the level of remittances. The determination of remittances by home 
country unemployment is also supported by Schrooten (2005) with a panel of countries 
from Central and Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans. Dragutinovic  Mitrovic and 
Jovicic (2007) also find a counter-cyclical pattern of remittances for Serbia, which is in line 
with the altruism motive for remitting. From a survey conducted on Romanian migrants to 
Italy, Kallai and Maniu (2007) find that the less educated tend to remit more.  
 
In summary, empirical research for the CEE countries has documented that regional 
mobility has been comparatively low in these countries, in spite of considerable regional 
disparities. Housing market imperfections appear to be an important reason for low 
mobility. On the other hand, international mobility has gained importance in some new 
EU member states, and has been traditionally important in former Yugoslavia. There is 
some evidence that remittances serve as an insurance mechanism against labour market 
shocks in the source country.  
 
1.2.1.4  Informal economy  
Informal employment provides additional flexibility to the labour markets in the event of 
adverse shocks. This is partly the consequence of the characteristics of the informal 
product market. Most of the informal firms are small in size and operate with constant 
returns to scale. So, the costs of entry are low, except if transaction costs are high. The 
other part of the story is that wages in the informal sector tend to be more flexible due to 
low bargaining power of the employees. These characteristics do not necessarily apply to 
all informal production and employment. Especially in cases where tax evasion is the main 
reason for going informal, flexibility of supply and of wages may not be higher than in the 
formal sector (for instance, in health and education). The evidence is ambiguous on most 
of these characteristics of the informal markets (World Bank, 2007). Also, theoretical work 
could support different implications of decisions to work informally (Gutierrez-Romero, 
2007; Bennett and Estrin, 2007; Galiani and Weinschelbaum, 2007). Studies in post-
socialist and transition economies have certain specifics because of the legacy of 
shortages and command economy. However, informal labour markets have not been 
studied intensively in these countries.  
 
In general, the informal sector tends to decline with sustained growth due to the rising 
demand for labour, with ambiguous effect on the flexibility of the labour market. This comes 
out from the studies that have looked at the share of informal economy in the GDP. 17 
However, the factors that influence these developments, beyond the increasing demand 
for labour in the formal economy, are not clearly accounted for. 
 
1.2.2  Factors shaping the labour market adjustment mechanisms 
1.2.2.1  Wage setting mechanisms, reservation wages and the role of trade unions  
Wage setting 
Calmfors and Driffill (1988), examining the impact of centralized and decentralized wage 
bargaining systems on the performance of labour markets, found that higher wage 
flexibility may be observed either in countries where wage bargaining is largely 
decentralized, e.g. in the Czech Republic and in the UK, or in countries with strongly 
centralized bargaining systems, such as Slovenia. Thus, countries with union coordination 
and without strongly centralized or decentralized bargaining structures may provide lower 
flexibility (Gruber, 2004). 
 
In the Central and East European countries wage setting was characterized by tight 
centralized controls prior to transition. At the beginning of the 1990s industrial relations 
systems typical of a market economy evolved and were set up in all countries, ‘moving 
away from a centralized wage setting system towards a collective bargaining system in the 
enterprise sector’ (Cazes, 2002). Employer organizations, non-existent under the former 
regime, were established; however, in most cases they are rather fragmented and less 
organized than trade unions. Thus, in the NMS trade unions sometimes lack the 
counterpart employer organization to negotiate with at an equivalent level (Gruber, 2004) 
and even if these organizations exist, they are often not authorized to conclude 
agreements.  
 
In the ‘old’ EU wage setting is mainly based on collective bargaining, but differs widely 
across countries concerning the degree of centralization and coordination at various levels, 
the coverage rates of collective agreements and the frequency of wage bargaining 
(Gruber, 2004). By comparison, in the NMS the collective bargaining structure is more 
decentralized. In contrast to the majority of NMS, the collective bargaining coverage is 
much higher in SEE countries, at least in those where information is available. 
 
Minimum wages and unemployment benefits 
Minimum wage regulations and unemployment benefits are two institutional determinants of 
wage flexibility that may have an impact on the degree of labour market flexibility. Both may 
reduce the downward flexibility of wages and compress the wage distribution (Tonin, 2004). 
Critics generally argue that high minimum wages negatively affect employment chances of 
low-productivity workers, including those with little working experience (youth), low skills and 
in backward regions (O’Keefe, 2004 quoted in Rutkowski and Scarpetta et al., 2005).  
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In all new EU member states either statutory minimum wages which lay down a specific 
rate of minimum wage applicable across all sectors were implemented or minimum wages 
that are fixed by collective agreements. In reality this distinction is not clear cut; in 
determining minimum wage levels governments are often confined to enforcing those 
levels that have been set by social partner agreements such as, for example, in Slovakia 
and Slovenia (European Foundation, 2007a). Minimum wages in the NMS vary between 
40 per cent of average net wages in Slovakia and 51 per cent in Hungary (Table 1). In a 
number of countries, such as the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, lower minimum 
wage rates for younger workers are set.  
 
Table 1 
Minimum wages  
Country Regulation Absolute level 
(EUR/month), 
2007
In % of average 
net wage, 
2006 
In % of  average 
gross wage, 





Czech Republic  government regulation  288 45 39  2.0
Hungary 258 51 38  8.0
Poland 246 39 33  2.9
Slovakia 217 40 34  1.7
Slovenia 522 n.a. 46  2.8
Estonia 230 n.a. 33  4.8
Latvia 172 n.a. 33  12.0
Lithuania 174 n.a. 38  10.3
Bulgaria 92 n.a. 49  16.0
Romania 114 n.a. 32  9.7
   
Albania 92.62 44 .  .
Bosnia and Herzegovina   
   FBiH  GCA, 2005 158 55 .  .
   Republika Srpska   GCA, 2006 105 40 .  .
Croatia Government  decision  280 . .  .
Macedonia  GCA, 2002, binding in 
public sector only
85 37 .  .
Montenegro   GCA 52 20 .  .
Serbia semi-annually  by 
Socio-economic 
Council
119 40 (42) .  .
Note: GCA – General Collective Agreement 
Source: For NMS Eurofound (2007), for SEE Arandarenko and Vukojevic (2008). 
Unemployment benefits 
Apart from Hungary and Yugoslavia, unemployment benefit schemes were non-existent in 
the CEE countries prior to transition. Income support systems for the unemployed were 19 
only introduced at the beginning of the 1990s when the emergence of open unemployment 
became increasingly evident. Being relatively generous at the beginning, unemployment 
benefit systems were subject to numerous adjustments due to growing fiscal pressures. 
Several countries therefore restricted eligibility criteria and reduced the duration of 
unemployment benefit entitlement. Benefit levels are earnings related and depend upon 
the duration of previous employment while the duration of benefit entitlement is contingent 
on the length of work experience (for further details see Vodopivec et al., 2003).  
 
Tax wedge in Southeast Europe 
There is a large body of literature suggesting that high levels of labour taxation may have 
detrimental effects on growth and employment/unemployment (Daveri and Tabellini, 2000; 
Haltiwanger et al., 2003; Nickel, 2003; Bassanini and Duval, 2006). Moreover, labour taxes 
are frequently blamed for contributing to the growth of the informal sector, resulting in lower 
formal and an increase in informal sector employment.  
 
A recent study by Arandarenko and Vukojevic (2008) exploring labour costs and labour 
taxes in five Western Balkan countries (WB-5) – Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia – found that from a comparative perspective, labour 
tax wedges are relatively high in the region. The main reason behind are high social 
insurance contribution rates. Since taxation is not progressive in most countries, the tax 
burden is high on low-wage workers and workers with dependents. Personal income taxes 
have generally been reduced over the past several years, resulting in the lowest rates as 
compared to the European Union, whereas social security contributions (remaining largely 
unchanged) are only slightly lower than in the EU-27.
1 In 2006/2007 the average tax 
wedge (ratio of total labour taxes to total labour costs) for single persons with average 
earnings was 29 per cent in Albania, about 33 per cent in both entities of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, and between 39 and 42 per cent in the other countries. Over time Croatia 
gradually lowered its tax wedge, from a very high level of almost 53 per cent in 1994 to 
41  per cent in 2007, through cuts in both personal income tax and social security 
contributions.  
 
As far as the three peer countries are concerned, the tax wedge has remained nearly 
unchanged at high levels (exceeding 40 per cent) in Slovenia over recent years; it slightly 
declined (to 42.2 per cent) in Romania; and it fell substantially (to 31 per cent, from 40 per 
cent in 2006) in Bulgaria. In the latter country the tax brackets have been lowered, 
particularly from 2001 onwards. During 2006 and 2007 three tax brackets were in force 
with rates of 20, 22 and 24 per cent respectively. Starting from 2008 a 10 per cent flat rate 
applies (EC, 2008). In Romania the flat tax came into force at the beginning of 2005, with a 
                                                           
1   In 2005 the PIT revenue accounted for an average 3 per cent of the GDP in the WB-5 region (the highest was reported 
for Serbia at 5.9 per cent), versus about 8 per cent in the EU-27. The respective figures for social security contributions 
were 10 per cent in the WB-5 versus 11 per cent in the EU-27.  20 
rate of 16 per cent, replacing the previous four-bracket system with tax rates ranging 
between 18 and 40 per cent.  
 
After a failed attempt to introduce a flat tax system in Slovenia, the number of tax brackets 
was reduced from five to three in 2007. Following the gradual abolition of the payroll tax by 
2009, the tax wedge is expected to decline in the coming years. 
 
The figures in Table 2 display a comparison of the tax wedge on low-wage workers (tax 
wedge for a single worker without children at 2/3 of average earnings – used also in the 
framework of the Lisbon Strategy) in the Western Balkan countries, the three peer 
countries and the EU-25. With the exception of Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina, all 
Western Balkan countries feature a higher tax wedge than the EU-25 average and 




Tax wedge for a single person at 2/3 of average earnings 
in %, 2006/2007 
Country   % 
Albania 27.9 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 
  FBiH  29.3 
  Republika Srpska   31.6 
Croatia 40.1 




Romania   42.2 
Slovenia 41.2 
EU-25 37.0 
Source: Arandarenko and Vukojevic (2008), Eurostat. 
 
Another measure of the tax burden on labour is the implicit tax rate (ITR), a backward-
looking indicator.
2 Estimates by Arandarenko and Vukojevic (2008) for the Western Balkan 
countries show a relatively stable level of close to 40 per cent of the ITR in the period 2003 
to 2005. This is higher than both the EU-27 average and the values obtained for the peer 
                                                           
2   The implicit tax rate (ITR) on employed labour is defined as the sum of all direct and indirect taxes and employees' and 
employers' social contributions levied on employed labour income divided by the total compensation of employees 
working in the economic territory increased by taxes on wage bill and payroll. 21 
countries. Albania stands out with the highest ITR in the region (almost 44%), while in 
Macedonia it is below the EU-27 average.  
 
Table 3 
Implicit tax rates (ITR) on labour in the Western Balkans and selected countries 
in % 
  2003 2004 2005 2006
Albania 41.3 44.3 43.9  .
Bosnia and Herzegovina  35.5 39.6 38.7  .
Macedonia   42.0 36.2 35.0  .
Montenegro 39.0 39.8 37.1  .
Serbia 40.8 42.5 41.6  .
WB-5 average  39.7 40.5 39.3  .
Bulgaria 35.5 36.3 34.7  30.9
Romania   30.1 29.2 29.1  .
Slovenia   37.8 37.5 37.5  37.6
EU-27 36.6 36.2 36.2  36.7
Source: Arandarenko and Vukojevic (2008), Eurostat. 
 
Impact of the tax wedge on labour market outcomes 
Reviews by Nickell (2003) and De Haan, summarizing the results of empirical studies on 
OECD countries, found that most analyses showed a negative relationship between the 
tax wedge and employment, but with differing elasticities ranging from -0.55 per cent 
(Daveri and Tabellini, 2000) to -0.11 per cent (Nickel et al., 2003). 
 
The literature on the impact of tax wedges on employment or unemployment in transition 
countries is limited. Evidence on a detrimental effect of the tax wedge on employment in 
the eight new member states is obtained from a study prepared by Rutkowski and 
Walewski (2007). In a pooled cross-section time series regression they show that a one 
percentage point increase in the tax wedge led to a 0.5 percentage points decrease in the 
employment growth rate. Cross-country regressions on the likely impact of labour taxes on 
employment in the Western Balkan countries by Arandarenko and Vukojevic (2008) yield a 
short-run labour demand elasticity of -0.21, indicating that a 10 per cent increase in labour 
costs will result in a (short-run) decrease in employment of 2.1 per cent. This elasticity is 
within the range of elasticities found elsewhere, but more towards the lower end. However, 
the results have to be taken with some caution since the quality of employment and wage 
data is poor and times series are short. Also, there are significant factors of a transitional 
nature such as privatizations and strong GDP growth that may have an impact on the 
results achieved.  
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Moreover, Arandarenko and Vukojevic (2008) argue that ‘once the Western Balkan 
countries enter a more stable development path, the relatively high tax wedge levels will 
have a significant negative effect on labour demand (particularly of the low-wage labour) in 
the formal sector’. For example, a study by Góra et al. (2006) using panel regressions for 
OECD countries provided evidence that employment rates of low-skilled workers are 
heavily affected by tax wedges while there is no effect on those of skilled workers.  
 
Trade unions 
Unions, and more generally industrial relations, play a crucial role in determining wage 
flexibility in response to economic shocks. Depending on union density, collective 
bargaining coverage, bargaining level and the degree of coordination, trade unions may 
influence the wage negotiation process through the setting of minimum wages, bargaining 
over wage increases and the shaping of the wage structure (Cazes and Nesporova, 2003). 
During the transition period, union density and consequently the impact of trade unions on 
wage setting and employment in the new member states fell dramatically, with the largest 
drops experienced in Hungary, Poland, Estonia and the Czech Republic (European 
Foundation, 2007b). In 2004 the level of unionization hovered at around 30 per cent in 
Slovakia and less than 20 per cent in the Baltic States, Poland and Hungary, as compared 
to over 50 per cent in the 1990s (Table 4). Croatia and Slovenia are the only exceptions, 
with union density above 40 per cent. By contrast, the coverage of workers by collective 
agreements exceeded union density, excepting Latvia and Lithuania, where it coincided 
with the low level of unionization (Cazes and Nesporova, 2006). In Slovenia almost all 
workers are covered by collective agreements. As a consequence of the general 
weakening of trade unions in the new member states, the bargaining power has been 
declining both at national and company levels, particularly in the private sector.  
 
The decline in union membership has been a common feature all over the European Union 
during the past decade, but was much more pronounced in the new member states. With 
the exception of Slovenia and Slovakia, all other NMS range at the lower end of the scale. 
Within the old EU countries, union density is highest in the Scandinavian countries 
(70-80 per cent), while extremely low in France (8 per cent).  
 
A number of reasons for the decline in union density are to some extent shared between the 
new and old EU member states, such as deindustrialization and the rise of the less 
unionized services sectors. Other causes are specific to the situation of the transition 
economies, such as the loss of credibility of the institution of the unions, which had been 
compulsory under the communist regimes. In addition, also privatization, high 
unemployment, and the increase in the number of small and medium-sized enterprises 
have been quoted as reasons behind low unionization rates in the new member states 
(EIRO, 2002; Anspal and Vork, 2007). Unions have fragmented politically, often dividing 
between those unions with a legacy as ‘official’ unions from the past and those which have 23 
emerged as newly independent (Upchurch, 2006). The collective bargaining process is also 





Trade union density and collective bargaining coverage in selected countries 
  Trade union density
1)  Collective bargaining
2) 
  coverage
  1995 2004 2004
Czech Republic  41 22 25-30
Hungary   29 18 +/-40
Poland 33 17 +/-40
Slovakia 57 30 +/-40
Slovenia   63 44 <100
Estonia 32 14 20-30
Latvia 25 16 10-20
Lithuania 15 14 +/-10
Bulgaria 37 20 25-30
Romania 30-35 n.a.
Albania n.a. n.a. n.a.
Bosnia and Herzegovina  . 66-68 .
Croatia 60-70 40-45 50
Macedonia . 45 .
Montenegro . 28-34 50-60
Serbia . 40 70
EU 25  26 25 66
Note: Bulgaria 1995 data refer to 1997; Montenegro estimate; Kosovo: Collective Agreement formally signed in 2004, but not in 
force yet. 
1) Trade union density: union members as a percentage of wage earners. – 2) Collective bargaining coverage: wage earners 
covered by collective bargaining. 
Source: European Foundation (2007b), www.worker-participation.eu; Bosnia and Herzegovina: World Bank (2005); Croatia: 
Bejakovic (2006), national experts. 
 
 
Collective bargaining coverage differs widely across Europe. Overall there is a divide 
between the bulk of the new EU member states bar Slovenia and the old EU member 
states, but also a considerable differentiation among the EU-15 (European Foundation, 
2007b). The average coverage rate in the new member states (37 per cent) is only half 
that of the EU-14 (excluding Greece) (Anspal and Vork, 2007). In most new member states 
collective bargaining is conducted at company level, while the sectoral level is most 
common for the old member states. Only Slovenia, Slovakia, Croatia, and recently also 
Bulgaria deviate from this pattern in some respect due to the presence of sectoral 
bargaining.  
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In general, trade union density has been declining in the majority of the Western Balkans, 
but is still higher than in the NMS; organizations are fragmented, this seems to fuel 
fragmentation on the employer side and vice versa (Sengenberger, 2006; Cazes and 
Nesporova, 2005). Though trade unions have changed for the better during the transition 
period, from party-controlled bodies to representatives of workers interests, their bargaining 
power has declined at all levels (Arandarenko, 2004). The union density is particularly low 
in the private sector. In most countries, excepting Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, 
there exist statutory requirements for tripartite consultations, but in many cases only on 
paper. Frequently the dialogue between the government and the social partners, 
particularly the trade unions, is lacking.  
 
In their multivariate regressions using parameters of the crucial labour market institutions 
Cazes and Nesporova (2000) did not find any difference between the OECD countries and 
the new EU member states concerning the overall effects of labour market institutions on 
labour market performance. Social dialogue has lost its impact on employment and labour 
force participation, unemployment, long-term unemployment since the 1990s. Union 
density played even a negative role in the case of youth unemployment, because of the 
strong protection of core workers, impeding the hiring of (inexperienced, young) workers.  
 
As for Estonia, Eamets and Kallaste (2004) estimated the union wage differential (union 
mark-up versus non-union pay) to assess the bargaining power of trade unions: results 
obtained reveal that trade unions in Estonia are weak in collective bargaining (no union 
wage differential). Finally, they conclude that ‘trade unions in Estonia do not have an 
essential impact on wages and unemployment’ and unions do not lower labour market 
flexibility. This does not come as a surprise taking into account a union density of only 
12 per cent.  
 
1.2.2.2  Employment protection legislation 
Rigid and inflexible labour markets have been considered an important source of high and 
persistent unemployment in Europe during the 1990s, particularly when compared with the 
US. Measuring flexibility or rigidity of labour markets was subject to numerous studies at 
that time – e.g. Lazear (1990), Nickell (1997), Blanchard and Wolfers (1999) and the 
OECD in its Job Study (1994) and its Employment Outlook (1999). Since then there has 
been a controversial debate among economists on whether or not flexible labour markets 
lead to higher employment and better overall economic performance. For instance, 
Arratibel et al. (2007) conclude that the empirical research results are very ambiguous and 
fail to reveal any consistent effect of employment protection legislation on the levels of 
employment and unemployment.  
 
There exist several definitions in the literature on labour market flexibility. Generally, labour 
market flexibility refers to the extent and speed with which labour markets adapt to 25 
fluctuations and changes in society, the economy and production cycles (Standing, 1999; 
HM Treasury, 2003; Eamets and Masso, 2004). The most widely-used distinction of labour 
market flexibility is the one made by Atkinson(1984) that distinguishes flexibility depending 
on where the flexibility exists (internal or external to the firm) and how it is developed 
(functionally, numerically or financially). This division allows for four distinct types of 
flexibility (Atkinson, 1984; Atkinson and Meager, 1986): external numerical or contractual 
flexibility, internal numerical or working time flexibility, functional flexibility and financial or 
wage flexibility. Hahn (1998) analyses flexibility within the general equilibrium theory, in 
which flexibility is a way to allocate all resources in a Pareto efficient way or characterize it 
in terms of institutional features that influence wage setting and supply and demand in the 
labour market, and ultimately labour market performance. 
 
The bulk of the literature on flexibility is focusing on employment protection legislation 
(EPL) of countries and shares of atypical employment or temporary, fixed-term work 
(Chung, 2007), an assessment of which is primarily a matter of data availability.  
 
In view of the EU entry and the subsequent adoption of the euro, labour market flexibility 
became also an important research issue in the then candidate countries. Following the 
OECD methodology Riboud et al. (2002) examined the role of labour market institutions – 
job security provisions, support programmes for the unemployed and other related policies 
– in a group of EU accession countries (the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, the 
Slovak Republic and Slovenia) in the 1990s and compared the results with those obtained 
for the OECD including the then EU countries. As far as flexibility is concerned, the Central 
and East European countries ranked somewhere in the middle of the scale measured by 
the employment protection legislation index (EPL)
3. For a large number of OECD 




The OECD methodology has been adopted by various authors to measure the stringency 
of EPL in Central and Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans as well. Micevska (2004) 
made the first attempt constructing the EPL indices according to the OECD methodology 
for a number of Southeast European countries: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro, and Romania. Additionally 
Micevska presented other cross-country information on labour market institutions of these 
countries. Micevska’s recent update of the employment protection legislation index for 
                                                           
3   This index is constructed as a weighted average of 22 different indicators describing various aspects of both permanent 
and temporary employment, as well as collective dismissals. Although some of these indicators are readily available 
from the countries’ labour code (e.g. notice period, severance payment, maximum duration of temporary contracts), 
most of them need to be constructed using different sources of information, together with some subjective aggregation 
method. 
4   Only the latter two include the consideration of collective dismissals, however. 26 
Southeastern Europe will be presented in section 2.2 (subsection Employment protection 
legislation).  
 
For individual Southeast European countries most research has been conducted on the 
flexibility of the Croatian and Macedonian labour markets. Having reported one of the 
strictest employment protection legislations among the SEE countries, Croatia’s EPL index 
fell to 2.8 after the introduction of the new Labour Law, effective from January 2004 
(Matkovic and Biondic, 2003). The Law was aiming at a more flexible labour market by 
shortening the lay-off periods before dismissal and reducing generous severance 
payments as practised in the past. Altogether, reforms were/are strongly focused on 
easing regulations for temporary employment. First results indicate that nowadays more 
than 80 per cent of all new labour contracts in Croatia are temporary which is also reflected 
in the rising share of temporary employment in the total number of employees. 
 
Impact of labour market institutions on transition countries’ labour market performance  
In a further step the research contributions examined the impact of labour market institutions 
on the labour market performance during the 1990s. In general, it was found that the 
transition countries had introduced similar institutions (with similar rigidities) as the old EU, 
with some differences across countries. It was concluded that the impact on unemployment 
was uncertain, but that institutions may have an impact on the composition of the labour 
force and of employment. This is supported by the findings of Boeri and Garibaldi (2006), 
arguing that labour market institutions are no more ‘rigid in the NMS than among the current 
EMU countries’ and that the perception of rigid labour markets in the NMS was mainly 
because of the low job content of growth in the region, the latter however being ‘related to 
productivity enhancing job destruction in the aftermath of prolonged labour hoarding’. 
 
Similar results were obtained from a study by Cazes and Nesporova (2003), stating that 
‘no statistical impact of EPL was found on the various unemployment rates of transition 
countries’ but EPL seemed to influence labour supply significantly. However, the results 
obtained for the latter display different outcomes for Western OECD countries and 
transition countries: while in Western countries stricter employment protection legislation 
tends to have a negative effect on employment and activity rates, in transition countries 
quite the opposite was found, i.e. restrictive legislation leads to higher levels of 
employment and labour market participation in the formal sector of the economy. This 
could be due to a stronger incentive to find or retain a job in the formal sector when job 
security is higher in that sector. Svejnar (2002) stressed that labour market flexibility, while 
being an issue, is not a major factor in comparison to varying degrees of imperfections and 
regulations in other areas such as in housing, transportation and capital markets.  
 
Ederveen and Thissen (2004), examining the impact of labour market institutions on 
unemployment in the ten new EU member countries, found that institutions were less rigid 27 
than in the EU-15 and that only a part of unemployment could be explained by institutions, 
even in the high-unemployment countries Poland and Slovakia. They concluded that in 
some countries labour market reforms could be conducive to improving employment 
performance (e.g. in Hungary, where a high tax wedge poses severe problems). Similarly, 
Blanchard et al. (2006) found that unemployment in some selected transition countries 
(Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Russia and Slovakia) ‘cannot be explained 
by the evolution of labour market institutions’ and if they matter, it has to be in combination 
with other factors in explaining unemployment. Schiff et al. (2007) and Bassanini and Duval 
(2006) arrive at the same results, arguing that labour market outcomes are not only 
influenced by flexibility, but also by a range of policies such as relatively high minimum 
wages, high labour taxes and extended social benefits.  
 
There is little literature on the impact of employment protection legislation in the Western 
Balkan countries. Among the few studies available, Micevska (2004) has explored the effect 
of various labour market institutions, including EPL as measured with her indices, on 
employment, unemployment and labour force participation, in general as well as for youth 
(unemployment) or women specifically, using a sample of 37 OECD, CEE and SEE 
countries. Micevska finds that the strictness of EPL has no effect on overall unemployment 
but that the stricter protection of temporary employment increases the unemployment rate 
for women and young workers and reduces labour force participation.
5 These findings were 
also confirmed for Macedonia (Micevska, 2004; Mojsoska-Blazevski, 2004), stating that less 
flexible labour markets seem to impair labour market prospects of those who are in greatest 
need of flexible labour markets. Nikolov (2005) arrived at similar results by making structural 
problems (lack of adequate education of the labour force, inefficient privatization, weak 
institutions, and unfavourable investment climate) rather than strict labour market regulation 
responsible for Macedonia’s high unemployment. 
 
An alternative view is given by Arandarenko (2004) discussing the impact of evolving labour 
market institutions in Southeast Europe on economic performance in view of the impact of 
international advice on the direction and speed of institutional change. The institutions 
examined include employment protection legislation, labour market policies, trade unions 
and collective bargaining structures. For his analysis Arandarenko divides the countries of 
the region into two groups: the successor states of former Yugoslavia, with more rigid labour 
market institutions, and the former centrally planned economies, with more flexible ones. In 
an attempt to indicate whether the two groups differ significantly with regard to economic and 
labour market performance, he concludes that no firm evidence is found to support the 
assumption that more flexible labour regimes induce better economic results.  
 
                                                           
5   We shall refer to the study of Micevska in section 2.3. where we attempted to undertake an update of the regression 
analysis. 28 
1.2.2.3  Institutional aspects affecting mismatch problems  
Active labour market policies (ALMPs) aimed at counteracting imbalances on the labour 
market still play a negligible role in most Central and East European countries and in the 
SEE countries as well. Though not differing significantly from those in the NMS, expenses 
earmarked for ALMPs are substantially lower than in the EU-15. Action is constrained by 
fiscal problems and difficulty of expanding the finance available for such policies, especially 
in the context of very high unemployment and where, accordingly, substantial funding is 
earmarked for passive measures of income support.  
 
Bulgaria is a notable exception in this respect: here the government has been decreasing 
the share of expenditures on passive spending in favour of active measures at times of 
high unemployment. Funds for ALMPs have been raised steadily and accounted for 
0.7 per cent of the GDP in 2004, with a number of priority programmes financed via the 
state budget (Beleva, 2004). Stronger reliance on active labour market policy measures 
together with the provision of more funds for training and upgrading of qualifications in 
order to increase employment of vulnerable groups, particularly the young and long-term 
unemployed, has proved to be effective. Coupled with fast economic growth, active labour 
market programmes and subsidized employment in particular helped to significantly reduce 
unemployment of vulnerable groups in Bulgaria. 
 
1.3 Conclusions 
From the literature survey the following factors emerged as being most relevant for the 
transition countries’ adjustment capacity to shocks. 
 
Wage flexibility 
Time series analyses have shown that some Central and Eastern European labour 
markets are not flexible enough to sufficiently provide for an adjustment to shocks. As a 
mechanism to provide for the adjustment of labour markets at the regional level, research 
on the so-called wage curve has shown that there is substantial heterogeneity across the 
CEE economies. 
 
Flexibility of labour supply and demand 
The CEE countries have seen large shifts in employment in the first decade of transition, in 
particular from industrial employment to services and, in some countries, also in and out of 
agriculture. At the same time, the labour force of the transition countries was reduced by 
rising inactivity. Labour turnover has stabilized at 20-35 per cent and established a 
countercyclical pattern. EPL affects labour turnover in so far as strict EPL decreases labour 
turnover.  
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An important dimension of labour market disequilibria is the mismatch of supply and 
demand of different skills at the sectoral, regional and occupational levels. This is due to 
slow adjustment of the skill structures in periods of rapid structural change that 
characterizes the transition economies.  
 
Regional and international labour mobility  
It is a well-established fact that regional labour mobility is comparatively low in the 
CEE  economies. Migration flows do respond to regional wage and unemployment 
differentials, but to a lesser extent than in the EU-15. In addition to the potential importance 
of informal social networks for job search, insufficient housing markets play an important 
role in preventing regional migration from becoming a strong mechanism to equilibrate 
regional labour markets. Adjustment takes place through reduced activity levels instead. 
 
International migration, by contrast, played an important role in alleviating unemployment in 
Yugoslavia already before 1989, and has continued to be of great importance in most of 
the successor states as well as in the other countries of the region (Romania, Bulgaria, 
Albania). For all these countries, remittances secure substantial parts of income for many 
households, providing an insurance against income losses due to labour market shocks.  
 
Informal labour markets 
Informal employment provides additional flexibility to the labour markets in the event of 
adverse shocks. In the CEE countries and even more so in the Western Balkan countries, 
a significant share of the employed is partly or fully working in the informal economy. In 
most Western Balkan countries the incidence of informality has been growing during 
transition, driven by incentives to evade taxes and avoid labour regulations.  
 
Wage setting mechanisms and the role of the trade unions 
In the EU-15 wage setting is mainly based on collective bargaining, but differs widely 
across countries concerning the degree of centralization and coordination at various levels, 
the coverage rates of collective agreements and the frequency of wage bargaining. By 
comparison, in the NMS the collective bargaining structure is more decentralized. 
Collective bargaining coverage is much higher in SEE countries than in the new 
EU member states, at least in the countries for which information is available. 
 
Employment protection legislation 
Available literature considers the strictness of employment protection legislation as one of 
the most relevant aspects of labour market flexibility. Results indicate that labour market 
legislation has adjusted significantly in the new EU member states from the outset of the 
transition, and EPL strictness has reached similar levels as in the EU-15. Employment 
protection legislation in the Western Balkan countries is on average less flexible than in the 30 
old and new EU countries, reflecting to some extent the delayed transition. The analysis 
shows in particular that regulations are still very strict for temporary employment in most 
countries of the region. Studies analysing the effects of employment protection legislation 
on labour market outcomes in the NMS concluded that labour legislation, while being an 
issue, would have to be considered alongside a range of policies such as relatively high 
minimum wages, high labour taxes and extended social benefits.  
 
Other institutional aspects  
Active labour market policies, which could play an important role in facilitating the matching 
of labour demand and labour supply as a means of smooth and quick response to 
economic shocks, are still underdeveloped in the Central and East European countries. 
Those in existence mostly concentrate on wage subsidies rather than on training 
programmes, which are more widespread in the old EU countries. Bulgaria has been a 
counter-example for a number of years with high spending on ALMPs. Re-training 
schemes (in particular for the older cohorts) and providing support for educational choices 
and possibilities (especially for the young) and for the reshaping of educational institutions 
would be important components of a strategy to deal with long-running matching problems 
in transition economies which continue to undergo fast structural change. 
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2    Labour markets in the Western Balkans and assessment of the 
likely impacts of the removal of labour market rigidities on 
adjustment capacities to shocks 
2.1   Overview of labour market developments in the Western Balkans  
2.1.1  Structural features of Western Balkan labour markets  
In contrast to the new EU member states (NMS), the economies in the Western Balkans 
have been facing complex and interrelated political and economic problems. Taking into 
account these ‘starting conditions’, output recovery has been much slower in Southeast 
Europe than in the Central European countries. Thus, labour markets began to improve 
with some delay as compared to the NMS. Following high GDP growth starting in most 
countries of the region by the end of 1999, employment increased everywhere, except in 
both Serbia and Montenegro where it has continued to decline – despite strong GDP 
growth. This seems to imply that increased productivity rather than the creation of new jobs 
has been the driving force behind growth (‘jobless growth’). The entire region is 
characterized by extremely low employment rates.  
 
Despite the ongoing recovery, unemployment shows little improvement with the exception 
of Croatia and probably so in Montenegro. High and persistent long-term unemployment 
has become a salient feature of the labour markets in the region; unemployment has a 
disproportionate impact on young people.  
 
Large informal sector activities are another important feature of these economies. 
Estimates on the size of this sector irrespective of the method used indicate a considerably 
larger share of the unofficial economy in SEE than in the new EU member states. As 
Arandarenko and Vukojevic (2008) state, ‘formality and informality in the region do not 
appear as binary choice, but rather along a spectrum of statuses, from full informality 
through semi-formality (agriculture, self-employment, double payrolls in many small private 
firms), to full formality most typically in the public sector’ (for further details see below). 
 
Data limitations are another aspect impeding the analyses of the Western Balkan 
countries’ labour markets and the outcome is controversial in some cases depending on 
the data source used. 
 
Employment rates 
With the only exception of Croatia, where some recovery started from 2002 onwards, 
activity and employment rates began to rise in most countries of the region only from 
2004/2005. Activity rates are ranging between 44 per cent in Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
close to 63 per cent elsewhere. These values are somewhat lower relative to Romania and 
Bulgaria, but far from the results obtained for Slovenia (70 per cent). In general, 
employment rates are very low compared to European standards, varying between 28 per 32 
cent in Kosovo and 57 per cent in Croatia (Figure 1). In Bosnia and Herzegovina only 
about one third of the working-age population is in employment, in Macedonia 40 per cent. 
In all other countries the employment rate hovers around 50 per cent, the only exception 
being Croatia where a certain measure of recovery started back in 2002. In almost all 
countries of the region low female participation is the factor that impinges markedly on 
overall employment rates. 
 
Figure 1 
Evolution of employment rates, 2000-2007 









2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
AL BA HR KS ME MK
RS BG RO SI EU-15
 
Source: National LFS. For Albania registration data. 
 
Both male and female employment rates are lower (female much lower) than in the NMS 
and in the EU-15. Croatia exhibits the highest female employment rate in the region, but 
would still range at the lower end of the scale if compared to the EU countries. Kosovo is 
an extreme case in that respect, with a value of only 10 per cent. Declines of the 
employment rates during the transition period were somewhat more severe for women 
than for men in Montenegro and Albania, while men were hit harder than women in 
Macedonia. Despite widening somewhat, the gender gap remained below the EU-25 
average (15 percentage points) in Croatia and was similar in Macedonia. In Albania and 
Montenegro it was still below the average of the southern EU countries (25 percentage 
points) and in Kosovo it was the highest. 
 
Notable differences between the Western Balkan countries and the three peer countries and 
the EU-15 exist also with regard to the employment rates of young persons. Despite some 
improvements of the labour markets in the region, the situation among the young 
(15-24  years) remains a matter of concern. As Figure  2 shows, employment rates have 
changed only marginally over recent years. Croatia has the highest youth employment rate, 33 
which is comparable to those in Bulgaria and Romania (at 25 per cent), but is still very low 
relative to Slovenia or the EU-15 (38 to 41 per cent). At the other end of the spectrum, only 
10 to 15 per cent of the young people are in employment in Kosovo, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and Macedonia. Serbia and Montenegro range somewhere in between the 
highest and lowest youth employment rates, at about 20 per cent each. In general, 
employment rates of young men are higher than for women, with the gap being only slightly 
larger in most countries of the region than in the EU-15 (an exception being again Kosovo).  
 
Figure 2 
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Source: wiiw Database incorporating national statistics.  
 
Supply of and demand for skills 
In the following we examine the developments on the supply and the demand side 
regarding the skill structure of the working-age population (15 year and over) of the 
Western Balkan countries compared with the three peer countries (Bulgaria, Romania and 
Slovenia). We also set these developments in relation to those in the EU-15. As illustrated 
in Figures 3 to 5, there are significant differences with respect to both supply- and demand-
side features between the Western Balkans and the peer countries, reflecting different 
inherited structures of education and different stages of structural adjustment processes 
relative to these economies. 
 
As regards the educational attainment levels of the working-age population, all Western 
Balkan countries except Croatia have a significantly higher share of low-educated than 
either the three peer countries or the EU-15. Close to 40 per cent belong to this group, in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Macedonia almost half of the working-age population, as 
compared to around 35 per cent in the EU-15 and the peer countries. On the other hand, 34 
the shares of the highly educated are in some cases (Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
Macedonia) much lower than either in the EU-15 or in two of the three peer countries 
(Bulgaria and Slovenia). Romania has a similar share of highly educated as Macedonia. 
The Western Balkan countries have a lower representation of the medium-educated 
compared to the peer countries (only Croatia is similar) but a much higher share as 
compared to the EU-15.  
 
Figure 3 
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Source: Eurostat, national LFS. 
 
Experience from other transition countries shows that particularly the low-skilled were 
heavily affected by employment losses during transition, while the high-skilled reported 
employment gains from the very beginning. Available data for the Western Balkans are 
patchy, thus comparable time series are not existent for the whole region. However, based 
on the information available one may conclude that these countries follow a similar pattern 
as the NMS.  
 
There is a clear link between educational attainment and the employment rate. Data 
referring to low-, medium- and high-skilled in the Western Balkan countries are only 
available for Croatia and Kosovo, while Macedonia uses another classification (including 
five educational groups). Figure 4 shows that employment rates in Croatia are very similar 
to those in the EU-15 or Bulgaria and Romania regarding the highly educated (above 
80 per cent are employed in that group of educational attainment), but they are much lower 
than in Slovenia. In Kosovo, the other reporting country, the rate is below the 80 per cent 
mark. Employment rates of the medium-educated are lower than in the three peer 
countries and the EU-15, while there is a big difference with respect to the low-educated, 
which show extremely low employment rates in both Kosovo (just 15 per cent) and Croatia, 
particularly if compared to Slovenia (around 40 per cent).  
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Periodic data on the educational attainment of the labour force, employed and 
unemployed, are not available for Albania. However, information from the Living Standard 
Measurement Survey (LSMS) indicates that employment rates are significantly higher for 
those with tertiary education than for those with lower levels of education. There is a larger 
proportion of tertiary educated in the pubic sector.  
 
Figure 4 
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Source: Eurostat, wiiw Database incorporating national statistics.  
 
As illustrated in Figure 5, the highly unfavourable labour market position of the low-educated 
in the Western Balkans is also borne out by the very high unemployment rates (over 50 per 
cent in Kosovo, over 30 per cent in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 15 per cent in Croatia) while 
the unemployment rates in Slovenia and Romania are below 10 per cent (Bulgaria: 18 per 
cent). The relatively low unemployment rate in Romania of that group reflects the still high 
agricultural employment. For the other two groups, the highly and medium-educated, the 
unemployment rates are again very high for Bosnia and Herzegovina and for Kosovo as 
compared to the three peer countries and the EU-15, indicating a rather tight labour market 
for this group of the labour force. The unemployment rate for the highly educated in Croatia 
is higher than in the EU-15 and the three comparator countries, while it is again much above 
that level in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Kosovo.  
 
Figure 5 
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Note: 2007 refers to 2006 for BiH, HR and KS. 
Source: Eurostat, wiiw Database incorporating national statistics.  36 
Employment patterns  
Owing to slow restructuring, changes in the sectoral composition of employment were less 
dramatic in the Western Balkan countries than observed in most new EU member states 
over the transition period. Coupled with a decline in industrial employment and a modest 
rise of services sector jobs, the proportion of agricultural employment even increased 
temporarily in most countries of the region and remained at high levels. Agriculture has 
absorbed laid-off workers from other sectors or has provided subsistence activity at times 
when the number of jobs in the formal sector was limited (World Bank, 2003). This differs 
significantly from developments in the NMS, where almost everywhere (except Poland and 
Romania) a rapid de-agrarianization process has been under way.  
 
Figure 6 
Employment structure by main sectors 2000 and 2007 
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Source: wiiw Database incorporating national statistics.  
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In Albania, where the agricultural sector accounted for more than 70 per cent of total 
employment in the 1990s, the share fell to about 58 per cent (or 51 per cent according to 
the Living Standard Measurement Survey, LSMS) at the beginning of the new millennium 
(Figure 6). Agriculture still accounts for about 20 per cent of total employment in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Serbia, Kosovo, and slightly less in Macedonia. Also in Croatia, the most 
developed country in the region, agriculture is still an important employer accounting for 
about 13 per cent of total employment in 2007.
6 Montenegro is an outlier with agricultural 
employment below 10 per cent of the total. 
 
A common feature of all Western Balkan countries is the sharp contraction of industrial 
employment at the outset of transition, reflecting the slow recovery of industry.
7 In general, 
the countries in the region display a smaller proportion of employment in industry than, for 
example, Slovenia but rather are following the pattern of Bulgaria and Romania, with 
industrial employment accounting for around 30 per cent of total employment. Outliers in 
this respect are Montenegro, Kosovo and Albania in particular, where the share of formal 
industrial employment accounts for only 14 to 20 per cent. 
 
Information on employment shifts by industrial branches is limited: only Croatia, Serbia, 
Montenegro and Macedonia report data at the 2-digit NACE level, but at different time 
horizons; Macedonian data have been subject to methodological changes (see Table A.1). 
Taking these limitations into account, we found strong employment cuts in the textile and 
clothing industries in Croatia and Serbia. Also Macedonia suffered from job losses in the 
textile industry, while it reports significant employment gains in the clothing industry. Thus, 
in 2005, the textile and clothing industries absorbed more than one third of total 
manufacturing employees in Macedonia. Despite employment losses, the food industry 
remained the dominant sector in terms of employment in Croatia and Serbia and has even 
increased its share in the number of total manufacturing employment in recent years, 
accounting for 17 and 20 per cent respectively. In the two other countries, the food industry 
ranks second, absorbing about 15 per cent of total employees in Montenegro and 12 per 
cent in Macedonia. The steel industry’s dominant role as an employer in manufacturing 
remained unchanged in Montenegro during the reporting period (2002-2005), accounting 
for one quarter of total manufacturing employment.  
 
The services sector is underdeveloped by European standards but also in comparison to 
the new EU member states. Available data show only slight changes of its share in total 
employment in the period 2000-2007. It seems, however, that this sector’s size is 
underestimated due to the large informal sector that is found almost everywhere in the 
                                                           
6   Registration data reveal a much lower proportion (5 per cent) of those employed in agriculture than obtained from the 
LFS (13 per cent).  
7   In 2007 Albania reached 63 per cent of its 1990 industrial output level, Macedonia 56 per cent and Serbia at about  
50 per cent. Croatia (the best performer in the region, but at the lower end compared with most NMS) reached 90 per 
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region and concentrates traditionally on services sector activities (together with 
construction and agriculture). Apart from the extreme value obtained for Albania, where the 
services sector absorbs only about 28 per cent of total employment, that sector is most 
developed in Montenegro, where it accounts for over 70 per cent in total employment, 
followed by Croatia and Kosovo.
8 The high number of services sector jobs in Montenegro 
is due to the high employment shares in trade, tourism and public sector jobs. Compared 
to other countries of the region, there had been a dynamic development in the Croatian 
services sector (especially in tourism, but also in transport) already in the 1970s and 
1980s. Services sector employment differs substantially across countries and sub-sectors.  
 
Apart from sectoral shifts, the employment structure by ownership has changed 
significantly, from the state (socially-) owned sector towards the private sector. Today 
private sector employment varies between 60 per cent in Serbia and in Montenegro and 
close to 70 per cent in Croatia and Macedonia (see Figure 7).  
 
Figure 7 
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Source: National LFS, Transition Report, national experts. 
 
Unemployment 
Unemployment has been extremely high in all Western Balkan countries, which is partly 
due to already high levels of unemployment inherited from the past. Apart from the 
extremes of Kosovo and Macedonia, where the LFS unemployment rate stands at 45 and 
35 per cent respectively (Figure 8), the incidence of unemployment is highest in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (29 per cent).
9 Both in Serbia and in Montenegro large-scale lay-offs and 
consequently the rise of unemployment started only after the implementation of economic 
reforms at the beginning of the new millennium, with some signs of improvement in the past 
two years. In Croatia unemployment fell steadily from 2001 onwards and stood at 9.6 per 
cent in 2007, but is still high compared to most of the EU countries. Montenegro is a special 
case where unemployment fell by 10 percentage points in 2007 to 19 per cent or even to 12 
per cent based on the data by the Institute of Strategic Studies and Prognoses (ISSP).  
                                                           
8  Services sector employment accounts for about 62 per cent in Hungary (the most ‘advanced’ country in that respect). 
9   All of these countries had entered the transition period already with a considerable level of unemployment in 1990: Kosovo: 
40.8%, Macedonia: 23%, Montenegro: 22.9%, Bosnia and Herzegovina: 21.2% and Serbia (including Voivodina): 16.7%. 39 
Figure 8 
Unemployment in Southeast European countries  
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Source: LFS of the respective countries. Albania: registration data. 
 
Figure 9 
Unemployment rate by LFS and registration data, 2007 
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Source: wiiw Database incorporating national statistics.  
 
Unemployment measured by registration is almost everywhere much higher than figures 
obtained from the LFS (Figure 9). The widest gaps occurred in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
and probably also in Macedonia, where registered unemployment is by 14 percentage 
points higher than the LFS rate. In Croatia the difference has constantly been about 
5 percentage points, while in Serbia the gap has been narrowing steadily over the past 
three years to 6 percentage points in 2007. These discrepancies may be explained by the 
fact that a large number of registered unemployed is de facto self-employed in agriculture or 
works in the informal economy. Many of them are often not actively seeking a job but they 
do register because of health insurance (Macedonia, Serbia) or in order to get access to 40 
some other social benefits (such as in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Croatia). In Albania 
registered unemployment fell from about 23 per cent in 2003 to some 13 per cent in 2007, 
but it was not accompanied by new job creation. Montenegro is the only exception in this 
respect, with the LFS unemployment rate exceeding that of registration. However, taking 
the lower LFS data provided by the ISSP, the picture would be similar to other countries. 
 
High and persistent long-term unemployment has become a salient feature of the labour 
markets of the region; those affected are running the risk of permanent exclusion and 
finally exiting from the labour market. The problem of long-term unemployment is much 
more severe in the Western Balkans than in the other transition countries and the 
proportion of those affected is by far higher. The most outstanding values are reported for 
Albania and Kosovo, exceeding 90 per cent, and Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
Serbia, around 80 per cent of total unemployed, while the share is ‘lowest’ in Croatia, with 
still almost 60 per cent long-term unemployed (Figure 10). However, these high shares of 
long-term unemployment can be assumed not to reveal the actual situation in the 
respective countries, due to the large flows between the informal sector, employment and 
unemployment. In general, a large proportion of people being long-term unemployed in the 
region is working in households or in the informal sector. Long-term unemployment is high 
among laid-off workers and young first-time job seekers; in addition, vulnerable groups 
such as refugees, displaced persons and war veterans are heavily affected. In most cases 
women are more affected by long-term unemployment than men, in Bosnia and 
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Note: Croatia: up to 2001 unemployed 13 months and more according to national LFS. From 2002 Eurostat. 
Source: wiiw Database incorporating national LFS; Albania: registration data. 
 
Unemployment hits disproportionately young people. In most countries of the region the 
unemployment rate among people younger than 25 years is twice as high as the total 41 
unemployment rate. Croatia, however, has made substantial progress in reducing youth 
unemployment recently. The high rates of 67 and 63 per cent in Kosovo and Macedonia, 
respectively, indicate a quite critical situation of young people on these countries’ labour 
markets (Figure 11). Young people lack professional experience, their options are either to 
emigrate or enter the informal economy (poor working terms).  
 
Figure 11 
Youth unemployment rates in SEE, LFS  
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Note: Albania: registration data. 
Source: wiiw Database incorporating national statistics, UNECE. 
 
Regional unemployment  
Most transition countries have been suffering from high and growing disparities in regional 
unemployment. The development of these widening disparities is closely linked to the 
process of transition; in the socialist past regional differences tended to be small (Huber, 
2006). Similar to the NMS there is a sizeable and persistent regional mismatch of 
unemployment in most Western Balkan countries which suggests that there are strong 
barriers to regional labour mobility. Figure  12 illustrates the differences between the 
regions with the highest and lowest unemployment rates, indicating that they are 
particularly high in Albania, but are still significant in most other countries of the region. 
However, the comparisons of these differences should be taken with caution since the 
number of districts varies across countries. Internal migration in Albania, which is still 
underway, is mostly from the northern districts of the country directed towards the urban 
centres in the central and the coastal regions; Tirana and Durres are the most important 
destinations. More than half of the recent internal movements have been towards the 
capital city of Tirana. 
 
LFS data for Croatia show that more than 60 per cent of the employed work within their 
residing area, and additionally 28 per cent are working within the same county. When 42 
analysing the effect of lacking regional mobility on the persistence of the regional 
unemployment rate differences, Botric (2007) found that low mobility in a county is 
associated with increased unemployment. An attempt made by the Croatian Employment 
Service to increase mobility within the country by making the entitlement to unemployment 
benefit conditional on the readiness of an unemployed person to accept a job offer within a 
50-kilometre distance from the place of residence did not succeed.  
 
Figure 12 












Source: Eurostat, national statistics. 
 
Despite the country’s small size, unemployment has also a strong regional dimension in 
Macedonia. It is particularly high in rural areas and in regions affected by restructuring. But, 
even within urban and rural areas, there are large differences in the incidence of 
unemployment, with rates ranging between 27 and 59 per cent in urban areas and 24 and 
67 per cent in rural areas (ILO, 2007). This seems to reflect also the ethnic diversity of the 
country.  
 
In Serbia the highest unemployment rates are recorded for Central Serbia (excluding 
Belgrade), while working conditions are better in the capital city of Belgrade (but still high at 
17.4 per cent in 2006) and in the Vojvodina region (agriculture). Central Serbia is also the 
region with the highest incidence of long-term unemployment. Similar to the NMS, limiting 
factors for the geographical mobility of the population are the high costs of the living 
standard outside the place of permanent residence and the inefficient housing market, but 
also cultural factors (Arandarenko and Jovicic, 2007; ILO, 2007). 
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Informal labour markets  
Due to the weakness of state structures as well as the functioning of the formal sector, 
large informal sectors and activities with important ties with the states have developed in 
the Southeast European countries. Among the employed, a significant number of people 
are partly or in full working in the informal markets. The estimates of informality vary, in part 
depending on the methodology used. Still, most estimates point to about one third of the 
GDP being produced informally and in some cases, such as in Kosovo, Albania and 
Macedonia, that share is even higher. In terms of employment the informal sectors’ share 
varies between 30 and 60 per cent of total employment. Informal employment has 
characteristics of involuntary employment, because it comes with much higher risks and 
lower rights than in the formal labour market. In that respect also, these countries have 
characteristics to be found in the developing world (Gligorov, 2003). In most countries of 
the region the incidence of informality has been growing during transition, driven by 
incentives for evasion of taxes and labour regulations as well as by the failure of the formal 
sector to provide jobs (Micevska, 2007b). Croatia is probably the only country in the region 
where informal sector activities have been on the decline over the past years (Sosic, 2004; 
Crnkovic-Pozaic, 2006).  
 
Table 5 
Serbia: characteristics and rates of informality among wage employees, 2005 
  Informality Share  in  Share  among 
  Rates  informal sector  wage earners 
Total  26.7 100  100 
Gender      
  Female   28.7  44.8  41.6 
  Male  25.2  55.2  58.4 
Age     
  15-24  52.1  14.0  7.2 
  25-54  25.9  80.0  82.4 
  55-64  15.3  6.0  10.4 
Education     
  Less than primary  51  4.5  2.4 
  Primary  29.3  14.4  13.1 
  Vocational  34  28.6  22.4 
  General Secondary  27.8  42.9  41.1 
  University  12.1  9.6  21.0 
Region     
  Belgrade  22.3  20.1  24.0 
  Central Serbia  25.5  44.6  46.7 
  Vojvodina  32.1  35.3  29.3 
Source: World Bank (2006). 
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According to the World Bank (2006)
10, informal employment in Serbia amounts to 43 per 
cent of all employees and 27 per cent of wages earners, excluding farmers. Rates of entry 
to or exits from informal employment are low. An overview of the main features of informal 
sector employment in Serbia is given in Table 5. Accordingly young and less educated are 
overrepresented in the informal sector, wages tend to be lower than in the formal sector 
especially if working hours are considered. But in general it seems difficult to ascertain the 
actual figures.  
 
In almost all countries of the region a significant number of registered unemployed are 
working informally and register to receive free health insurance; estimates for Macedonia 
suggest that about 70 per cent of the registered unemployed fall into this category 
(Micevska, 2007b). Low-skilled workers, most affected by the disintegration of the formal 
job market, have higher incentives to rely on employment in the informal sector than 
others. Heavy labour taxes are identified as being the most conducive to informality. As for 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bojicic-Dželilovic et al. (2004) found that tax evasion and non-
payment of social insurance contributions were apart from non-registration of workers 
particularly evident in the small firm sector. 
 
In general, the informal sector tends to decline with sustained growth due to the growing 
demand for labour, with ambiguous effect on the flexibility of the labour market. 
 
2.1.2  International labour mobility and remittances 
International migration from the countries of the Western Balkans 
International migration from the countries of the Western Balkans is significant, diverse, 
and complex. In former Yugoslavia, guest-worker emigration was already established in 
the 1960s in order to alleviate labour market imbalances, thus extensive expatriate 
networks exist. On Albania, estimates suggest that up to one fifth of the population left the 
country between 1989 and 2001. In Serbia, total net immigration during the 1990s masks 
large gross flows in both directions. In the Southeast European peer countries, Romania 
and Bulgaria, emigration escalated after 1989, substantially adding to declining 
demographics.  
 
Table 6 presents an overview of the extent of migration originating from the countries of 
Southeast Europe in the EU-15.
11 According to these data, Albania is by far the most 
                                                           
10   According to the World Bank informality includes (i) self-employed individuals who have not completed postsecondary 
education, (ii) household-helpers, (iii) wage earners and owners of private firms with less than 10 employees. All wage 
earners in the state- and socially owned sectors are considered  formal.  
11   Certainly, these data do not cover total emigration from the countries concerned. Besides, they suffer from the usual 
limitations of the coverage of migration by population and labour force statistics: short-term migrants are typically 
excluded from such data, and LFS data are not representative with respect to migration. However, we are not aware of 
a similarly up-to-date but more comprehensive dataset on the extent of emigration from Southeastern Europe.  45 
affected by emigration of its population, with the share of EU-15 migrants climbing to over 
20 per cent since 2004. Migrant communities from Bosnia and Herzegovina in the EU-15 
have been comparatively large throughout the 2000s, with 7 to 10 per cent of the country’s 
population. Interestingly, the share of the Serbian population residing in the EU-15 has 
considerably declined, to around 6 per cent recently. Migration from Romania and Bulgaria 
to the EU-15 has slightly increased to 4 to 5 per cent of the population, while Slovenian 
nationals in the EU-15 amounted to about 1.5 per cent of the country’s population.  
 
Table 6 
Population from Southeast European countries in the EU-15 by sending country,  
numbers, and per cent of home-country population 
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Albania 380,978  427,682 476,055 591,120 670,646 722,022  753,266  872,064
 12.45% 13.91% 15.39% 19.00% 21.45% 22.98% 23.87% 27.56%
Bosnia-Herzegovina 341,737  337,591 326,663 328,512 319,676 324,897  318,786  314,885
 9.06% 8.88% 8.55% 8.57% 8.32% 8.46% 8.29% 8.19%
Croatia 304,066  306,452 324,005 336,967 323,121 322,001  321,335  314,881
 6.80% 6.90% 7.29% 7.59% 7.27% 7.25% 7.23% 7.09%
Macedonia 86,795  104,440 105,679 136,577 143,693 153,749  162,144  145,888
 4.28% 5.13% 5.20% 6.74% 7.07% 7.55% 7.95% 7.14%
Serbia 882,767  854,709 898,762 853,982 381,367 592,968  514,778  432,839
 11.74% 11.39% 11.99% 11.42% 5.11% 7.97%  6.95%  5.86%
Bulgaria 58,489  83,384 166,913 200,412 227,987 265,764  285,698  309,749
 0.72% 1.04% 2.12% 2.56% 2.93% 3.43% 3.71% 4.04%
Romania 180,927  230,444 283,607 461,381 602,039 764,616  930,430  1,096,664
 0.81% 1.04% 1.30% 2.12% 2.78% 3.53% 4.31% 5.09%
Slovenia 29,339  29,947 31,922 33,642 33,504 33,712  34,307  32,616
 1.48% 1.50% 1.60% 1.69% 1.68% 1.69% 1.71% 1.62%
Note: figures are based on different data sources due to availability.  
Source: national statistics, Eurostat, LFS. 
 
Labour mobility in the Western Balkans 
Labour mobility within the Western Balkan countries has been increasing over recent 
years. This is confirmed by Slovenian data in particular, suggesting that working permits 
have been steadily on the rise. More than three thirds of all new immigrants originate from 
the countries of the former Yugoslavia. The large majority of foreign labour comes from 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, followed by Serbia, Macedonia and Croatia. Migrant workers 
(most of them low-skilled) represent about 7.3 per cent of Slovenia’s labour force. Taking 
into account its small size, also Montenegro absorbs quite a significant amount of migrant 
workers from the region. During the period 2005 to 2007, their number rose by more than 
50  per cent to 39  thousand. Almost half of these labour migrants come from Serbia, 
followed by Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia. Croatia has introduced a quota 46 
system for foreign workers similar to Slovenia’s. Accordingly the quota for and 
consequently the number of foreign workers has increased in recent years, although their 
share in total employment is not very high. Informal employment, however, is not included 
in the data provided by the Statistical Office, which does not distinguish between foreign 
workers and domestic population. Again, Bosnia and Herzegovina is the most important 
sending country. Information on the other countries is scarce; for example, the 
Employment Service of Serbia reports altogether only 370 guest workers from the Western 
Balkans. On the other hand, there seems to be some limited labour mobility in the 
Albanian-speaking countries and regions (Kosovo, western Macedonia, southern Serbia 
and northern Albania), but the evidence is missing at large (Hoti, 2008).  
 
The data discussed above give an impression of the significance and heterogeneity of 
Southeast European emigration. However, they are insufficient to provide for insights on 
the extent to which international migration may act as a mechanism to adjust labour supply 
to demand in the presence of shocks in the source countries. First, stock data contain no 
information on inflows and outflows of migrants. Second, most seasonal migration is likely 
not to be covered by the datasets used. Third, bilateral migration across the countries of 
Southeast Europe is scarce.  
 
Due to the deficiencies of data collection, there is little economic research on migration 
affecting the countries of the Western Balkans, except for the cases of Albania and 
Romania, which have gained increasing interest more recently. Country summaries of 
data, policies and case studies for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia 
(including Kosovo) and Montenegro, as well as Bulgaria and Romania, are offered by 
Petronijević (ed., 2007). The analyses of that volume highlight the variety of migration flows 
that have been affecting the countries of the Western Balkans: 
•  Bosnia has historically been, and still is, an area characterized by large emigration. The 
most recent migratory movements have been dominated by exile flows to Croatia, 
Serbia and Montenegro and other European countries. The return of the affected 
population is still far from settled.  
•  Together with sizeable stocks of diaspora populations in the Western countries and 
ongoing emigration, Croatia is characterized by the presence of refugees and irregular 
migrants, as well as the recent phenomena of labour and retirement immigration.  
•  Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo have large diaspora populations in Western Europe 
and other industrialized countries as well. At the same time, Serbia and Montenegro 
have become hosts for inflows of refugees from Bosnia and Croatia, and for internal 
flows of displaced persons from Kosovo.  
 
Importantly, in the above countries, a considerable part of recent migration movements in 
these countries has been related to political causes and has been thus shaped by other 
than economic motivations.  47 
The research of migration affecting Albania has experienced a recent surge. King and 
Vullnetari (2003) and Lucas (2005) provide comprehensive summaries of related empirical 
work. With regard to the potential role of international migration to foster labour market 
adjustment, interesting results are provided by Castaldo et al. (2005). That study explicitly 
considers district-level labour market variables to determine individual migration 
propensities. It reports that a one percentage point increase in the local unemployment rate 
increases the migration propensity of an average individual by 0.4 percentage points, while 
a five per cent increase of the local hourly wage reduces the respective migration 
propensity by 0.55 percentage points. Besides, unemployed individuals are found to be 
more likely to consider migrating than employed or self-employed individuals.  
 
We have investigated the partial correlation of the migration shares presented in Table 7, 
as well as their annual changes, with several indicators of cyclical economic conditions, 
such as GDP growth, the output gap, and unemployment, controlling for country-fixed 
effects and time-specific effects. According to our results, none of the above indicators is 
significantly correlated with the share of migrants from the Southeast European countries 
or its change. From this exercise, it can only be concluded that there is no strong and 
immediate relationship between cyclical conditions and migration flows, since migration 
stocks or changes in migration stocks are too poor proxies for migration flows to allow 
stronger claims.  
 
Summarizing the above, it appears that in the case of migration processes affecting the 
Western Balkans, other determinants dominate those related to cyclical conditions of 
labour markets. This conclusion is confirmed by the findings regarding remittances (see 
below). Also, theory suggests that home-country labour market conditions are only part 
among a variety of determinants of migration flows, many of which relate to host-country 
conditions, such as employment opportunities and income levels, the presence of ethnic 
networks, relative returns to skill, etc. Also from the perspective of the sending country, 
higher migration flows may not necessarily be related to adverse labour market conditions: 
in fact, threshold levels of wealth may be necessary to finance emigration and therefore, an 
economic upswing may produce even more migrants. The evidence from Albania quoted 
above suggests, however, that international migration may also play a role to alleviate 
labour market imbalances.  
 
Remittances 
Migrant remittances refer to income earned in the host country of migration that is sent or 
brought to the home country. More specifically, this term covers the following items: 
(1) workers’ remittances, i.e. transfers abroad by resident workers (who live in the host 
country for at least 12 months); (2) compensation of employees, i.e. earnings paid by host-
country employers to migrants who are not residing in that country, such as seasonal 
workers; and (3) migrants’ transfers, namely cash and goods transferred by re-migrating 48 
individuals at their relocation back to the home economy (IMF, 1993). Understanding 
remittances in a more narrow perspective, only the first category corresponds to the notion 
of remittances as transfers of individuals residing abroad to family members in their 
countries of origin (Chami et al., 2008).
12 Besides, according to official data, that category 
is the most relevant among the above items.  
 
The countries of the Western Balkans are fairly heterogeneous in terms of the role of 
remittances, as shown by the official balance of payments statistics on remittances 
presented in Table 7.  
•  Albania as well as Bosnia and Herzegovina are countries with particularly high inflows of 
remittances. Bosnia and Herzegovina has received inflows of remittances of around 16 
to 18 per cent of its official GDP throughout the present decade, while in Albania official 
inflows increased from just above 12 per cent in 2000 to more than 20 per cent in 2006. 
•  In Croatia and Macedonia, the role of remittances is much less pronounced: those 
countries have received recent inflows of 2.5 to 5 per cent of their GDP. Both countries 
showed a tendency of increasing remittance inflows during the 2000s. 
•  The peer countries show considerable heterogeneity with respect to remittances as 
well. While inflows barely play a role in Slovenia, they amount to around 2 per cent of 
GDP in Bulgaria and are rather high, at 7 per cent of GDP, in Romania.
13  
•  The above heterogeneity is reflected in the compensation of employees received in 
those countries as well, while the extent of those flows is well below the flows of 
workers’ remittances. Receipt of compensation of employees from abroad has been 
particularly relevant in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where such flows amounted to 8 to 10 
per cent of GDP. Interestingly, among the peer countries, those flows are around three 
times larger than workers’ remittances in Bulgaria, while they are at rather low levels in 
Romania.
14 
•  Although outflows of both workers’ remittances and compensation of employees have 
been below one per cent of the countries’ GDP throughout the 2000s, flows amounting 
to around 0.5 per cent of GDP in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia 
nevertheless show that these countries also serve as hosts of worker migration. 
                                                           
12   Compensation of employees contains salaries of employees of embassies and international institutions among others 
as well: such flows are less relevant in terms of their impact on the source economy. Besides, this category contains 
employers’ payments for social security, and part of the compensation of employees is spent in the host country, so 
that only a fraction ends up in the source country of migration. Migrants’ transfers are again corresponding to different 
situations and economic behaviour than workers’ remittances in the narrow sense, and these flows have very poor 
statistical coverage.  
13   We conjecture that the large increase in the relative inflows in 2005 from levels close to zero is due to changes in the 
recording of remittance statistics.  
14   Note that the reliability and international comparability of the official data on remittances is considerably impaired since 
above remittances sent via the banking system, (which do feature in the balance of payments statistics) do not 
necessarily contain information from money transfer companies, and typically disregard informal channels of 
remittances. Besides, official remittances via the banking system are reported only above a threshold that is at EUR 
12,500 in the eurozone countries. Therefore, the total amount of remittances is most likely underestimated by up to 50 
per cent (World Bank, 2006b).  49 
Table 7 
Workers’ remittances and compensation of employees in the countries  
of Southeast Europe, debits and credits as share of GDP, 2000 to 2006 
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Workers' remittances, credits   
Albania    12.41 12.12 12.92 17.39 21.72 21.93 20.33
Bosnia and Herzegovina   16.00  13.86 13.72 18.77 20.66 19.35  17.76
Croatia    2.47 2.35 2.61 3.43 3.69 3.36 2.53
Macedonia    1.91 1.59 2.18 4.00 4.62 4.50 4.91
Bulgaria    n.a. 2.37 2.85 4.34 2.73 2.62 2.04
Romania    0.00 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.04 5.87 7.11
Slovenia    0.06 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.02
Compensation of employees, credits   
Albania    1.57 1.66 1.81 2.47 2.79 2.44 3.18
Bosnia and Herzegovina   10.64  8.77 7.75 9.76 8.91 8.20  7.18
Croatia    0.38 0.57 0.68 1.06 1.44 1.43 1.87
Macedonia    0.01 0.13 0.32 0.77 1.49 1.52 1.71
Bulgaria    0.39 2.50 3.86 6.61 8.05 6.54 6.44
Romania    0.21 0.22 0.27 0.24 0.23 1.49 1.49
Slovenia    0.81 0.72 0.77 0.97 1.15 1.12 1.13
Workers' remittances, debits   
Albania   n.a.  n.a. n.a. 0.00 0.00 n.a.  0.00
Bosnia and Herzegovina   n.a.  -0.08 -0.09 -0.16 -0.75 -0.40  -0.53
Croatia    -0.13 -0.12 -0.10 -0.07 -0.07 -0.08 -0.10
Macedonia    -0.34 -0.48 -0.53 -0.42 -0.42 -0.37 -0.39
Bulgaria   n.a.  n.a. n.a. n.a. -0.11 -0.12  -0.10
Romania   n.a.  0.00 n.a. 0.00 0.00 -0.01  -0.01
Slovenia   0.00  n.a. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00
Compensation of employees, debits   
Albania   .  .  .  -0.09 -0.10 -0.12  -0.46
Bosnia and Herzegovina   -0.04  -0.09 -0.11 -0.17 -0.20 -0.18  -0.17
Croatia    -0.06 -0.05 -0.07 -0.17 -0.18 -0.14 -0.14
Macedonia   .  .  -0.02 -0.01 -0.04 -0.04  -0.05
Bulgaria    -0.18 -0.16 -0.08 -0.08 -0.07 -0.08 -0.13
Romania    -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.04 -0.05
Slovenia    -0.12 -0.11 -0.18 -0.29 -0.36 -0.40 -0.52
Sources: wiiw annual database (GDP), IMF balance of payments statistics (remittances). 
 
The international IMF balance of payments statistics do not include entries on Serbia and 
Montenegro. According to existing evidence, this region belongs to the highest remittance 
recipients world-wide. In 2004, private remittances amounted to 17.5 per cent of GDP 
(European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2006). 
 
In the context of possible adjustment mechanisms against labour market shocks, 
remittances may be particularly relevant in so far as they may serve as insurance against 50 
negative income shocks to the family left behind in the home country.
15 Evidence for or 
against the investment motive has been sought by investigating the cyclicality of 
remittances and their correlation with source-country unemployment in particular. Empirical 
evidence on these matters is ambiguous: with a dataset containing a dozen of developing 
countries, Sayan (2006) shows that the cyclicality of remittances is country-specific, 
including cases of pro- or a-cyclicality. Therefore, generalizations from cross-country 
studies may be misleading. The country specificity of the cyclical behaviour of remittances 
is also supported by Sayan and Tekin-Koru (2007) who investigate remittance flows from 
Germany to Turkey and from the US to Mexico. For the countries of the Western Balkans 
specifically, Dragutinovic Mitrovic and Jovicic (2007) find that remittances are determined 
by the level of unemployment, while output and wages in the home country do not play a 
role for remittance levels. The determination of remittances by home country 
unemployment is also supported by Schrooten (2005) with a panel of countries from 
Central and Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans.  For Serbia specifically, 
Dragutinovic Mitrovic and Jovicic (2007) find a counter-cyclical pattern of remittances, 
which suggests that remittances are motivated by altruism rather than by the wish to insure 
against asymmetric shocks.  
 
The empirical literature provides, in sum, rather weak evidence that remittances serve as a 
means to insure against fluctuations of income in the countries of Southeast Europe. 
Instead, there appears to be the risk of dependence on steady inflows of remittances from 
abroad, independently of cyclical conditions in the source-country economies, as 
evidenced in a habit formation model for consumer goods imports in Serbia in the above 
paper by Dragutinovic Mitrovic and Jovicic (2007). Using the above data on remittance 
inflows to the countries of Southeast Europe as summarized in Table 7 and a measure of 
the output gap in these countries, and controlling for country-specific and time effects, we 
have not found any partial correlation between these variables either.
16 International 
migration may certainly be the response of some individuals to adverse labour market 
conditions, but existing evidence rather suggests that this is not the predominant motive on 
average and across countries. Instead, migration and remittance flows appear to be driven 
by different determinants.  
 
2.2   Cross-country analyses of labour market flexibility in the Western 
Balkans: Factors shaping the labour market adjustment mechanisms 
2.2.1  Wage setting mechanisms and the role of trade unions  
In most countries of Southeast Europe the bargaining power of trade unions has declined 
at all levels (national, branch and enterprise), but there are large differences between 
                                                           
15   Along with the insurance motive, previous research has hypothesized two other motives for remitting: first, migrants 
may display altruism and support household consumption at home with their income abroad. Second, migrants may 
seek to accumulate savings to be invested at home. 
16   Regression results are available upon request. 51 
public and private firms regarding the role of trade unions. In large public and privatized 
companies, union coverage and power are still strong and wages are determined mostly 
through collective bargaining, while in small (private) firms wages are determined at the 
enterprise level, reflecting the firms’ ability to pay and the workers’ bargaining power 
(Micevska, 2007b; Racic et al., 2005; Krsmanovic, 2007). Ognjenovic (2007) found that in 
Serbia wage setting, particularly in the public (state) and socially owned enterprises, is 
limited by budget constraints (permanent control by the IMF) and targeted inflation rates, 
so that it is primarily addressed by the economic policy makers, and the trade unions’ role 
in the wage setting in both the public and the private sectors is rather small. As for Croatia, 
it turns out that despite a relatively high collective bargaining coverage, ‘the implementation 
of signed collective agreements is weak with surveillance and enforcement mechanisms 
underdeveloped’ (ILO, 2003 and 2004). In the private and SME sectors, bargaining takes 
place on an individual basis or unilaterally and the payment for salaries is not to be taken 
for granted or is below the contractually agreed level. Another factor limiting the social 
partners’ impact on collective bargaining and the creation of labour market policies, results 
to some extent from the high share of informal employment, such as in Macedonia 
(Micevska, 2007b). 
 
An analysis of the wage setting systems needs to include also informal arrangements 
since in almost all countries of the region a significant portion of the workforce is employed 
under some type of informal work. In general, wages in the informal sector tend to be lower 
than in the formal sector, especially if working hours are considered. Table 8 illustrates the 
ratio of informal versus formal sector wages in Serbia. 
 
All countries but Croatia have implemented minimum wages. In Macedonia, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and Montenegro they are part of the general collective agreements, while in 
Serbia and Albania they are enacted by government decrees after negotiations between the 
social partners through national tripartite bodies (Arandarenko and Vukojevic, 2008). In 
Bosnia and Herzegovina the practice of minimum wage setting differs between the two 
entities: provisions in the Federation BiH envisage minimum gross and net wages per hour 
and an automatic indexation in the case of cost of living increases or general economic 
improvement once a year, while there is no indexation foreseen in the Republika Srpska. In 
the latter workers and employers associations and the government decide on the minimum 
wage in the last trimester of the current for the next year (Tomic, 2007). However, in both 
entities the provisions are binding for all companies, irrespective on whether they take part 
in the negotiations. In Croatia the statutory minimum wage was abolished in 1996, when 
instead a so-called lowest wage regulation was introduced – the lowest rate to be paid for 
full-time work and the threshold for paying social contributions (Bejakovic, 2006).  
 
Minimum wages as a percentage of the average net wages are comparable with those in 
the NMS, ranging between 20 per cent in Montenegro and 55 in the Federation BiH. 52 
However, in most countries (except Serbia), additional regulations are in place, driving up 
minimum wages – e.g. wage coefficients multiply the base minimum wages depending on 
the education level of the employee (Arandarenko and Vukojevic, 2008). For example, in 
Montenegro reporting the lowest minimum wage to average wage rate (20 per cent) the 
minimum wage for individuals with a university or higher education degree is as high as 54 
per cent of the average wage (Rutkowski and Scarpetta et al. 2005).  
 
Table 8 
Serbia: wages in the formal and informal sectors in Serbia, 2005 
  Ratio mean monthly wage  Ratio mean hourly wages 
  informal/formal informal  vs.  formal 
Total  0.72 0.66 
Age    
  15-24  0.72  0.66 
  25-54  0.75  0.68 
  55-64  0.64  0.65 
Gender     
  Female   0.71  0.64 
  Male  0.73  0.68 
Education    
  Less than prim.  0.58  0.64 
  Primary  0.89  0.81 
  Vocational  0.81  0.78 
  General Second.  0.79  0.75 
  University  0.78  0.69 
Region    
  Belgrade  0.80  0.72 
  Central Serbia  0.73  0.67 
  Vojvodina  0.68  0.64 
Source: World Bank (2006a). 
 
Unemployment benefit systems and active labour market policies 
Unemployment insurance systems in Southeast Europe are characterized by low 
replacement rates (Table 9), a relatively short duration of unemployment benefit compared 
with long unemployment durations and the limited coverage, in particular if compared to 
the old and new EU member countries: In Albania the proportion of unemployment benefit 
recipients has dramatically decreased over time, from 35 per cent in 1993 to about 7 per 
cent of total unemployed during the 2000 to 2006 period. Having reached initially the level 
of the minimum wage, the level of the unemployment benefit fell to less than 40 per cent of 
the minimum wage from 1999 onwards (Gjipali, 2007). In the Federation BiH the 
unemployment benefit is determined as 40 per cent of the officially published average net 53 
salary for the three months prior to unemployment. In addition in October 2006 the Law on 
the Rights of Demobilized Soldiers was enacted, envisaging that registered unemployed 
soldiers, war veterans and families of war victims are entitled to more generous provisions. 
Following the law’s enforcement the number of demobilized soldiers registered as 
unemployed increased by about 26 thousand persons between August 2006 and August 
2007 (Tomic, 2007). The Croatian legislation envisages a minimum level of unemployment 
benefit as a percentage of the average wage (20 per cent) and a maximum level, set by 
government decision (HRK 1200 in October 2007). Serbia and the Federation BiH are 
exceptions with respect to the (official) unemployment benefit duration, envisaging a 
maximum of 24 months, while the majority of the other countries of the region the benefit 
entitlement is limited to 12 months. However, the average duration is very likely much 
longer, since the bulk of unemployment benefit recipients accounts for older persons, 
enjoying more generous regulations than those with a shorter working period before 
unemployment. Kosovo does not provide unemployment benefits to the registered 
unemployed, there only exists a social assistance programme which has been introduced 
in 2000 targeting poor households (Hoti, 2007). 
 
Table 9 
Unemployment benefit mid-2000s 




Albania 20 12  months 7
Bosnia and Herzegovina 
  FBiH  40 3-24 months 1.7
  Republika Srpska  2
Croatia 20.5 2.5-10.25  months 22.7
Kosovo . . .
Macedonia   37 14 months 10
Montenegro 10 3-12  months 9
Serbia  60, 50 3-24 months 7.5
Bulgaria  4-12 months 19.7
Romania 40-60 6-9  months 36.2
Slovenia  70, 60 3-24 months 19.6
1) Replacement rate in % of:  
AL (2005) average monthly wage in the public sector 
FBiH (2005) average net salary prior to unemployment 
HR: average net wage 
MN: national basic minimum wage 
RS: previously earned average net wage, 60% first three months, 50% thereafter 
RO: % of national minimum gross wage 
SI: average gross wage prior to unemployment; after three months 50%. 
2) Duration of benefit entitlement: depending on the years of work prior to unemployment. Most countries offer longer periods 
for those prior to retirement. E.g. the average duration of UE benefit in MN is 48 months.  
Source: National experts, World Bank, ILO, wiiw. 
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Active labour market policies (ALMPs) aimed at counteracting imbalances on the labour 
market still play a negligible role in the SEE countries (Table 10). In the countries where 
information is available the structure of spending on active labour market policies differs 
from that in other transition countries and is mainly concentrated on wage subsidies, the 
stimulation of self-employment, small enterprises and job search assistance (for Croatia 
see, Račić et al., 2005). By contrast, in most of the old and new EU countries expenditures 
on ALMPs are primarily earmarked for training programmes, job search assistance and 
public work.  
 
Table 10 
Expenditures on labour market policies as a percentage of GDP 
2005/2006 
  Active measures  Passive measures  Total 
Albania n.a.  0.10  n.a. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
  FBiH  0.27  0.38  0.98 
  Republika Srpska  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Croatia 0.06  0.32  n.a. 
Macedonia 0.05  n.a.  n.a. 
Montenegro .  0.30  1.60 
Kosovo n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Serbia 0.10  0.80  0.90 
Bulgaria 0.43  0.21  0.72 
Romania 0.10  0.39  0.54 
Slovenia 0.20  0.41  0.71 
EU-15 0.70  1.44  2.34 
Note: The sum of active and passive measures does not sum up to the total; the difference is due to the expenditures on LMP 
services. 
Source: Eurostat, national experts. 
 
 
2.2.2  Employment protection legislation  
Employment protection regulations in Southeast Europe
17  
Employment protection legislation (EPL) refers to regulations that restrict the employers’ 
freedom to dismiss workers. While their objective is to ‘protect’ the welfare of employees by 
reducing their exposure to unfair treatment and to the risk of fluctuating incomes, these 
regulations may increase the costs of employing workers (for an overview of potential 
benefits and costs of EPL, see OECD, 1999).  
 
                                                           
17   This section is based on the background paper for this study prepared by Maja Micevska. 55 
In the following, we construct EPL indices for eight Southeast European (SEE) countries 
and for Kosovo using the OECD methodology. In particular, we consider the legislation on 
permanent employment, temporary employment and collective dismissals. The EPL is a 
weighted average of 22 indicators, some readily available in quantitative form (e.g., notice 
period or severance payment), some constructed using qualitative information (e.g., 
difficulty of dismissal). These indicators are based on very detailed normative information, 
which is coded and aggregated according to a weighting scheme. The EPL index takes 




Employment protection legislation (late 1990s/early 2000s) 
   Regular  Temporary  Collective  EPL   
  Year employment  employment  dismissals  index 
          

































Kosovo 2001  1.3  2.8  4.6  2.5 










Montenegro 2003  2.2  4.5  4.8  3.6 
Romania   2003  1.7  3.0  4.8  2.8 






















CEE average  late 1990s  2.7  1.2  4.1  2.4 
EU average
3 late  1990s  2.4  2.3 3.2  2.5 
OECD average
4 late  1990s  2.1  2.0  2.9  2.2 
Note: The CEE countries here include: the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia.  
1) Does not include figures for Kosovo, Romania, Serbia, and Montenegro, since data are not available for the late 1990s. –  
2) Includes the 1995 figures for Albania. – 3) Does not include Luxembourg. – 4) Does not include Mexico, Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland, and the Slovak Republic. 
Source: Own calculations based on labour codes and other (mainly) national sources for SEE countries; Riboud et al. (2002) 
for CEE countries; OECD (1999) for OECD and EU countries. 
 
Table  11 shows the EPL indices for the SEE countries and for Kosovo, which were 
calculated based on available labour codes (as amended up to a certain year) and other 
(mainly national) sources. Several conclusions can be drawn from the information 
presented. First, the SEE countries that constituted former Yugoslavia (Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia) initially adopted more rigid 56 
labour codes than their neighbours in the region (Albania, Bulgaria, and Romania).
18,19 
Kosovo, which was also a part of former Yugoslavia, is an exception with its relatively 
flexible labour code. However, the estimation of Kosovo’s EPL index was done using the 
so-called ‘Regulation No. 2001/27 on Essential Labour Law in Kosovo’ adopted by the 
United Nations Interim Administration Mission for Kosovo (UNMIK) in October 2001. The 
Essential Labour Law is – by its nature – not a comprehensive law. It contains only the 
essentials and does not cover several important fields in employment and labour relations 
which need to be covered by legislation. Therefore, the relatively low value of the Kosovo’s 
EPL index could be partly a result of the incomplete nature of the labour code. 
 
Second, in the 1990s the need for rapid structural adjustment after the introduction of 
economic and social reforms was reflected in profound amendments to national labour 
legislation (usually after heated discussions among social partners). This generally led to a 
substantial decrease of workers’ protection and a reduction in the EPL indices to levels 
comparable to those prevailing in developed market economies. The Croatian example is 
particularly noteworthy: in less than a decade the country has moved from the highest to 
relatively low levels on the rigidity scale.  
 
Third, currently the SEE countries do not seem to constitute a monolithic group with 
respect to their national EPL. A comparison of the overall EPL index as presented in 
Table 12 reveals substantial disparities: the index values range from 2.5 in Kosovo to 3.6 in 
Montenegro. This is above the CEE
20 and EU averages. A closer look at the components 
of the EPL index reveals that the SEE countries have relatively flexible regular employment 
legislation, with indices mainly below the CEE and EU averages. On the other hand, the 
SEE indices on temporary employment are much higher than the CEE and EU averages, 
with the exception of Croatia, which recently liberalized its temporary EPL to a significant 
extent by legalizing the functioning of temporary work agencies. The disparities among the 
SEE countries are highest with respect to the collective dismissal legislation, with Albania 
and Bulgaria being quite flexible (with indices of 2.8 and 2.6 respectively) and Montenegro 
and Romania quite restrictive (both with an EPL index of 4.8). To shed additional light on 
the similarities and differences among the SEE countries, the following analysis elaborates 
on all three components of the EPL index. 
 
                                                           
18   This is probably a result of some built-in institutional mechanisms taken from the previous system of worker self-
management (unique for former Yugoslavia) that could not be discarded easily at the beginning of economic and social 
reforms. 
19   In Serbia and Montenegro, before the adoption of completely new labour legislations in the early 200s, the Yugoslav 
Law on Labour Relations was in force. The law provided a high degree of employment protection. However, it did not 
contain the elements of modern legislation. Thus, applying the OECD methodology to calculate the EPL index based 
on this law would not yield comparable results. 
20   The CEE countries here include: the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovak Republic and Slovenia. 57 
Regular employment legislation establishes the rules for hiring and firing procedures 
concerning permanent workers, notification requirements, and severance payments. 
Except for Croatia, this legislation is quite flexible in the SEE countries (with index values 
ranging from 1.3 to 2.2). In most countries a dismissal comes into effect through a written 
statement to an employee. Dismissals in almost every SEE country are justified on the 
basis of capacity or conduct and because of economic redundancy. Montenegro is an 
exception: dismissals are fair only when the employer can demonstrate the worker’s lack of 
integrity or actions prejudicial to the company’s interests (such as negligence, imprudence, 
or disobedience). Poor performance is not a legal ground for dismissal in Montenegro. In 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro and Romania employers are required to 
look for retraining or to ensure the worker’s transfer to another suitable position.
21 Overall, 
Croatia remains the outlier of the group with the most restrictive regular employment 
legislation and an index value of 2.6. This is mainly because of the long notice period and 
the large severance payment in the case of the dismissal of workers after more than 20 
years of service. 
 
Temporary employment legislation regulates the use of fixed-term contracts, their renewal 
and maximum duration, as well as the functioning of temporary work agencies. This is the 
legislation where the SEE countries are quite restrictive, with most indices ranging above 
3.0. Most of the countries have relaxed their restrictions on the use of temporary contracts. 
The overall strictness of this type of legislation stems mainly from the fact that, except for 
Croatia and Romania, the legislation of the SEE countries does not stipulate the existence 
of temporary work agencies.
22 
 
Collective dismissal legislation defines the term ‘collective’, as opposed to ‘individual’, and 
stipulates notification requirements and payments associated with such dismissals. In this 
case, the SEE countries do not constitute a homogeneous group: Albania and Bulgaria 
have the least restrictive legislation with index values significantly below the CEE and EU 
averages, while the indices of Croatia, Kosovo, Montenegro and Romania are above the 
CEE and EU averages. This is due to substantial disparities in SEE legislation on collective 
dismissals. First, considerable differences exist in the definitions of ‘collective dismissal’. 
While in most countries the ‘collective dismissal’ is defined as dismissal of more than 5 
employees, in Albania and Croatia the term refers to the dismissal of at least 20 workers, 
while the Bulgarian labour code does not contain a definition of collective dismissals at all. 
Second, there are significant differences regarding the additional delays and costs 
imposed on employers in the case of collective dismissals vs. individual dismissals. While 
                                                           
21   With the 2003 amendments of the Croatian labour code, the retraining requirement is imposed only on employers with 
at least 20 employees. 
22   In Romania the use of temporary work agencies is limited to specific reasons, leading to a relatively high value of the 
temporary EPL index. 58 
in Bulgaria there are no additional delays for the notification to take place, in Kosovo and 
Croatia the delays amount to three months.  
 
Overall, the comparison between the SEE countries on the one hand and the CEE and 
OECD countries on the other shows that the SEE countries tend to be relatively restrictive. 
However, this rigidity mainly stems from their legislation on temporary employment and 
collective dismissals, while the SEE legislation on regular employment is quite flexible. 
These cross-regional comparisons suggest that in adopting and amending their labour 
legislation during the transition period, the SEE countries have been mainly focusing on 
relaxing the regular employment restrictions, while insufficient attention has been paid to 
the benefits of adopting more flexible legislation on temporary employment and, in some 
countries, more flexible legislation on collective dismissals.
23  
 
2.2.3  Evaluating the effect of EPL on labour market outcomes  
We evaluate the effect of EPL on labour market outcomes in the countries of Southeast 
Europe using a simple OLS regression framework with a dataset for 2003 including 
14 countries of the EU-15 (Luxembourg is missing), 7 countries of the new EU member 
states (namely, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and the three peer 
countries Romania, Bulgaria and Slovenia), 9 additional OECD countries (Australia, 
Canada, Japan, Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, and the United 
States), and 6 Southeast European candidate countries and potential candidate countries 
of the EU, respectively (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia and 
Montenegro, Turkey). Actually the size of our sample is very small, including 36 
observations from one particular period of time. In addition, we can employ relevant control 
variables to a very limited extent (see below). Our results should therefore be received with 
due caution. 
 
In empirical research, the effects of EPL (and other labour market institutions) on labour 
market outcomes, employment and unemployment in particular, are typically studied in a 
reduced form framework, regressing the outcome variable(s) on the institutions of 
interest.
24  This approach is structurally based on the employer-employee bargaining 
model of wage determination of Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991). The model 
distinguishes a downward sloping labour demand schedule, which is determined by 
product market conditions, and an upward sloping labour supply schedule, that is shaped 
by institutional and policy factors that are relevant in the wage bargaining process. Within 
                                                           
23   In contrast, the liberalization in EPL between the late 1980s and the late 1990s in the OECD countries was mostly due 
to liberalization of temporary contracts (OECD, 1999). 
24  See e.g. Boeri et al. (2000) on the employment rate, and Amable et al. (2007) and Rovelli and Bruno (2007) on the 
unemployment rate. Some studies employ further control variables such as the output gap, public employment (for 
both, see e.g., Boeri et al., 2000), or productivity (e.g., Amable et al., 2007). A different way to look at the impact of EPL 
on labour markets is to study their effects of job and worker flows. Due to the lack of suitable data, we are not 
considering this approach in further detail. 59 
this framework, a number of institutional determinants are potentially relevant for labour 
market outcomes. The review of Bassanini and Duval (2006) identifies and discusses the 
following: unemployment benefits, taxes, trade unions and collective bargaining structures, 
employment protection legislation, product market regulation, active labour market policies, 
minimum wages, incentives to labour mobility, and housing policy.
25   
 
In our empirical assessment of the impact of EPL on labour market outcomes in the 
countries of the Western Balkans, we follow this practice of estimating reduced form 
equations, regressing the outcomes on EPL and other control variables. Our basic model 
is  
     α + β EPL + γ X + δ C + ε ,  
 
where labour market outcomes are explained by the levels of employment protection 
legislation (where we distinguish the three sub-indices separately), other relevant control 
variables X, country-specific controls C, and an error term ε. We implement the analysis as 
follows.  
• As  for  Y, we consider separate equations for employment and unemployment rates of 
males and females respectively.
26  
•  As for the index of employment protection legislation, we employ a vector of the three 
sub-indices for regular employment, temporary employment, and collective dismissals.  
• As  for  X, we consider a single control variable, namely an index for the rule of law.
27 
This index measures the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the 
rules of society, in particular the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the 
courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. The inclusion of this variable is 
motivated by the need to control for the possibility that the employment protection 
legislation rules may not be applied in practice, in particular in economies with large 
shares of informal activities as the countries in the Western Balkans.  
•  We employ dummies for the four country groups as described above (EU-15, NMS, 
other OECD, Southeast Europe). First we employ all country dummies, using the ‘other 
OECD’ as omitted reference group, and drop the insignificant country dummies in 
subsequent regressions.  
 
We have deliberately chosen a parsimonious empirical approach focusing on the core 
variables of our interest. The lack of internationally comparable data for 2003 hinders us to 
                                                           
25   For a review of theory arguments on the impact of labour market institutions on unemployment, see Stiglbauer (2006). 
The more recent work of Amable et al. (2007) has extended the list of relevant institutions by financial market 
regulations and central bank independence among others. 
26   Note that employment and unemployment rates add up to labour force participation rates. We decided to analyse the 
two aforementioned labour market outcomes because our participation data on Southeast Europe were inconsistent 
with the other two indicators and appeared less reliable than the former.  
27   This index measures the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, in particular the 
quality of contract enforcement, the police and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.  60 
extend our dataset by the full set of indicators discussed e.g. by Bassanini and Duval 
(2006) as described above.  
 
We do have the possibility to employ information on union density, ALMP expenditures, 
and the replacement ratio in our regressions. However, these variables are not available 
for all the countries of our sample. We consider the reduction of the sample size and the 
need to drop observations on South-Eastern European countries in particular
28 a serious 
drawback against the extension of the number of regressors. In Tables A.6 and A.7 in the 
Appendix, we present versions of the estimations described above augmented by the 
above institutional variables and the output gap
29, to illustrate the robustness of our results 
(see below)
30.   As is shown in these tables, some of our above results are sensitive to the 
specifications chosen. Therefore, our interpretations and conclusions should be received 
with the qualification that further research with better data – that is unavailable at present – 
is imperative to study the validity of our results. 
 
Our dataset consists of the following variables: first, sub-indices of employment protection 
legislation which originate from the OECD Employment Outlook 2004, Vodopivec (2005) 
for Slovenia, Cazes and Nesporova (2006) for Bulgaria and Croatia, and Micevska (2007c) 
for the other countries of Southeast Europe; second, employment and unemployment rates 
that were collected from OECD publications, Eurostat and national datasets; third, the rule 
of law index that is available from the World Governance Indicators dataset of the World 
Bank. The data refer to the year 2003 except for the EPL index for Albania (1995) and 
Serbia and Montenegro (2001), where we had no more recent data up to the reference 
year 2003 available.  
 
Table  12 presents the averages of the variables employed by country groups. The 
countries of Southeast Europe suffer from particularly high unemployment rates for both 
genders and comparatively low employment rates, in particular for females. These 
countries offer higher protection levels for the employees, in particular for temporary 
employment. According to the EPL indices, the strictness of EPL covering permanent 
employment and collective dismissals is in fact lower than in the EU-15 and NMS-10 on 
                                                           
28   Our regressions in Tables A.6 and A.7 are based on 31 observations. The countries dropped from our original list of 
36 observations are Bosnia and Herzegovina, Korea, Mexico, Romania, and Turkey. 
29   Information on the institutional variables included in the additional regressions stems from the OECD for its members, 
and Cazes and Nesporova (2006a) for the countries of the non-OECD countries of our sample. Output gap is obtained 
from OECD data for its members. For the other countries, it is calculated following the OECD methodology for 
establishing potential output as described in Giorno et al. (1995); a smoothing parameter of 6.25 is applied.  
30   In addition, we have investigated the impact of the tax wedge (as measured by the implicit (macro) tax rate on labour) 
on male and female employment and unemployment respectively. Since the implicit tax wedge is not available for the 
non-EU countries of the OECD and since this variable proved to be insignificant in our regressions with a reduced 
sample size, we do not report the respective results. 
 61 
average. As concerns our control variable, law and state institutions have considerably less 
relevance in these countries than in any of the other country groups.  
 
Table 12 
Summary statistics of the variables, 2003 
Rates  EU-15 NMS-10  Other  OECD  SEE 
      
Total working-age population     
Unemployment  6.9 11.2 5.2 26.2 
Employment 65.76  57.9  69.98  43.69 
Participation 72.66  69.1  75.18  69.89 
        
Males      
Unemployment  6.39 10.97 5.12 22.57 
Employment 73.61  63.44  78.8  53.33 
Participation 80  74.41  83.92  75.9 
        
Females      
Unemployment  7.95 11.54 5.01 29.23 
Employment  57.9 51.96 61.4 30.11 
Participation 65.85  63.5  66.41  59.34 
  
EPL      
Total  2.19 2.00 1.59 2.89 
Permanent 2.34  2.31  1.7  2.23 
Temporary  2.05 1.36 1.53 3.33 
Collective  3.39 3.80 2.57 3.13 
  
Additional   
Rule of law index  1.51  0.44  0.39  -0.56 
 
 
Next, Table 13 shows the values for the EPL index and its sub-indices, as well as for male 
and female employment and unemployment respectively, for the Western Balkan countries 
which are the focus of our research and the three peers. Note that, because of the different 
data sources used, our EPL indicators for Bulgaria and Croatia differ from those reported 





EPL index, employment, unemployment in the SEE and peer countries 
Country EPL  index  males  females 
  total  reg.  temp.  coll.  (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Albania 2.6  2.1  3.0  2.8  61.4  12.9  38.3  18.2 
Bosnia and Herzegovina  2.6  1.8  3.1  3.3  42.3  28.9  20.8  34.9 
Croatia 2.7  2.7  2.8  2.5  60.7  12.8  46.3  15.6 
Macedonia 2.8  2.0  3.1  4.0  45.6  37.0  31.3  36.3 
Serbia and Montenegro  2.9  2.2  3.1  3.8  54.6  15.1  40.6  17.2 
Bulgaria 2.0  2.2  3.4  2.6  56.0  14.1  49.0  13.2 
Romania  2.8  1.7  3.0  4.8 63.8 7.5 51.5 6.4 
Slovenia  2.7  2.7  2.3  4.8 67.4 6.3 57.6 7.1 
(1) - employment rate, (2) - unemployment rate, in per cent, respectively.  
Sources: see above. 
 
The correlations among the variables employed are reported in Table 14. As the figures 
show, multicollinearity is no matter of concern in our empirical analysis.  
 
Table 14 
Correlations among the variables employed 
 EPL_REG 
  EPL_TEMP 
  EPL_COLL 
  LAW 
  EU-15 
  NMS 




   
 
EPL_COLL -0.0003 
  0.1269 1.0000




***  -0.2156 1.0000
   
 
EU-15 0.2094 
  0.0340 0.1420 0.5045
***  1.0000
   
 
NMS 0.1090 
  -0.2691 0.2961
*  -0.2606 -0.3919
**  1.0000 
 
OTHER OECD  -0.3765 
**  -0.2296 -0.3948
**  0.2878
*  -0.4606




***  -0.0415 -0.7175
***  -0.3568








Our results reflect that the employment rates of males are significantly lower in both the 
EU-15, the NMS and the SEE countries than in the reference group comprising the rest of 
                                                           
31   In addition to the above caveat considering the sensitivity of our results to the inclusion of additional regressors (at 
the expense of the sample size), there is also some indication of misspecification problems concerning our 
regressions. In particular, both the Jarque-Bera LM test for normality and the skewness and curtosis test of Stata 9 
suggest the rejection of normality of the residuals for the regressions both unemployment for both males and 
females. This flaw also applies to the regressions reported in Table A.6 and A.7 in the Appendix (with the exception 
of the specification on female unemployment reported in the first column of Table A.7). We would like to draw the 
attention on the fact, however, that Lagrange Multiplier tests, such as Jarque-Bera, are large sample tests. Our 
sample is a limiting case of a large sample at best. 63 
the OECD. The rule of law index is not significant, and neither are the sub-indices of 
employment protection legislation. We thus fail to explain the levels of male employment by 




Regression results: male employment and unemployment 
Male working-age population 
      
   
Dependent variable:               
employment rate  coeff. 
  (s.e.) coeff.
  (s.e.)  
   
EPL – regular  1.7980 
  (1.2803) 1.6592 (1.2800)  
 
EPL - temporary  -0.5072 
  (1.0239) 0.2148 (1.1719)  
 
EPL – collective  -0.9441 
  (1.0780) -0.5996 (1.0182)  
 
rule of law            
             3.1313 (2.2130)  
 
EU-15  -5.2852 
**  (2.4698) -6.2409
**  (2.6136)  
 
NMS  -15.3866 
***  (3.0695) -12.6224
***  (3.7339)  
 
SEE  -23.2276 
***  (3.9131) -18.5651
***  (5.3708)  
 
Constant  78.9444 
***  (2.9346) 72.8433
***  (4.9864)  
 
Adj. R²  0.70      0.71           
 
      
   
Dependent variable:                    
unemployment rate  coeff. 
  (s.e.) coeff.
  (s.e.) coeff. 
  (s.e.) 
EPL – regular  -0.6081 
  (0.8619) -0.5562 (0.8583) 0.0875 
  (0.7242)
EPL - temporary  -0.7577 
  (0.8291) -1.0276 (0.9678) -1.4286 
*  (0.8508)
EPL – collective  1.2984 
  (1.0022) 1.1696 (1.0057) 1.5911 
*  (0.8240)
rule of law            
             -1.1703 (1.5780) -1.8565 
  (1.1815)
EU-15 1.2160 
  (1.4939) 1.5732 (1.6677)           
            
NMS  4.4879 
*  (2.5878) 3.4547 (3.0890)           
            
SEE  15.4469 
***  (4.3080) 13.7042
***  (4.7399) 11.5723 
**  (4.9150)
Constant 3.9852 
  (2.6427) 6.2655 (4.1674) 6.5953 
*  (3.2859)
Adj. R²  0.47      0.46      0.50     
Note: ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, 10% respectively. Robust standard errors.  
 
For male unemployment, among the country group dummies, only the control for 
Southeast Europe is found significant. In addition, we find some evidence that stricter 
regulation of temporary employment and collective dismissals have similar but 
counteracting effects on male unemployment respectively. Increasing the EPL sub-index 
for the regulation of temporary employment by one point decreases the unemployment rate 
of males by 1.4 percentage points, while a similar tightening of rules on collective 
dismissals increases male unemployment by 1.6 percentage points.  
 
In the explanation of female employment rates, controlling for the rule of law makes a 
considerable difference, as reflected by the substantially increased R² of our regressions. 64 
In our preferred specification in the last column of Table 16, all country group dummies are 
all insignificant except for the EU-15, where female employment is by 5 percentage points 
lower ceteris paribus than in the other country groups. However, stricter rule of the law 
coincides with considerably higher employment: an index value that is one point higher 
implies a 12 percentage point increase in higher female employment compared to other 
countries. We find a negative effect of stricter protection of temporary contracts on female 
employment: a one point increase in the index implies a reduction of female employment 
by 2.3 percentage points. At the same time, increasing the strictness of collective 
dismissals by one point is found to positively impact on female employment and increase it 
by 1.8 percentage points in particular.  
 
Table 16 
Regression results: female employment and unemployment 
Female working-age population 
      
   
Dependent variable:                 
employment rate  coeff. 
  (s.e.) coeff.
  (s.e.) coeff. 
  (s.e.) 
EPL – regular  2.8185 
  (1.8498) 2.3200 (1.5494) 1.9030 
  (1.1730)
EPL - temporary  -5.2107 
***  (1.6043) -2.6169 (1.6017) -2.3278 
*  (1.2564)
EPL – collective  0.7594 
  (1.6886) 1.9971
*  (1.1208) 1.8111 
*  (1.0673)
rule of law            
             11.2484
***  (2.3945) 12.4500 
***  (1.9542)
EU-15 -2.7471 
  (4.8995) -6.1802
**  (2.6359) -5.2462 
*  (2.6149)
NMS  -13.0289 
**  (5.0262) -3.0990 (4.1382)           
            
SEE  -20.2043 
***  (6.4864) -3.4554 (4.7050)           
            
Constant  62.6491 
***  (5.1991) 40.7325
***  (5.4657) 38.9978 
***  (5.4567)
Adj. R²  0.61  0.78  0.79 
 
      
   
Dependent variable:                 
unemployment rate  coeff. 
  (s.e.) coeff.
  (s.e.) coeff. 
  (s.e.) 
EPL – regular  -0.6134 
  (1.1244) -0.4897 (1.1041) 0.3894 
  (0.8388)
EPL - temporary  -0.0098 
  (1.2079) -0.6533 (1.3200) -0.7815 
  (1.1816)
EPL – collective  0.9865 
  (1.0534) 0.6795 (0.9808) 1.3671 
  (0.8332)
rule of law            
             -2.7907 (1.9492) -2.5839 
*  (1.4590)
EU-15 2.7518 
  (1.8077) 3.6035
*  (2.0970)           
            
NMS  5.6901 
**  (3.0480) 3.2265 (3.8767)           
            
SEE  16.8913 
***  (4.3704) 12.7360
**  (5.5123) 10.8685 
*  (5.4456)
Constant 3.5368 
  (2.9843) 8.9742
*  (4.7922) 7.2659 
*  (3.8308)
Adj. R²  0.46  0.47  0.48 
Note: ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, 10% respectively. Robust standard errors.  
 
Finally, considering female unemployment, we do not find an effect of employment 
protection legislation on its levels. Instead, stricter rule of law reduces female 
unemployment, where a one point higher index corresponds to 2.5 percentage points less 
unemployment. Looking at the groups of countries, we find significant differences for the 65 
group of Southeast Europe only, where female unemployment is found 11 percentage 
points higher on average than in the other countries in the sample.  
 
Summing up, we have found an impact of employment protection legislation on male 
unemployment and female employment. In both cases, regulations of temporary contracts 
and collective dismissals matter in opposed directions. There is also a polar relationship in 
the effects on males and females. Tightening the regulation of temporary employment 
benefits males as it decreases male unemployment, but it harms women as it decreases 
female employment at the same time. Since our regressions have not revealed a 
corresponding effect on female unemployment rates, the findings implicitly suggest that 
tighter regulations of this segment of the labour market correspond with lower female 
participation. Similarly, women profit from tighter regulations of collective dismissals as they 
enjoy higher employment rates, but such regulations also keep male unemployment 
higher.  
 
2.2.4 Wage  flexibility 
2.2.4.1  Analysis of wage-productivity relationship 
Introduction 
An insight into wage behaviour can be obtained by analysing the relationship between real 
wage and productivity growth. We could look at this relationship either in one direction, i.e. 
how and to which extent productivity shocks get absorbed into real wage developments, or 
in the other direction, whether a wage and real wage push affects the employment intensity 
(the inverse of labour productivity) of an economy or of a particular sector. An analysis of 
this type is particularly interesting when conducted at the sectoral level, as one can analyse 
whether there are differences in how the individual sectors (e.g. tradable vs. non-tradable) 
absorb productivity and or wage (or real wage) shocks. In the following, we examine the 
patterns of growth of these two variables both at the national and sectoral level in the 
Western Balkan countries under consideration and compare them with the group of peer 
countries defined above. 
 
Methods and data 
Data for this analysis are taken from the wiiw Annual Database. More specifically, we use 
series for GDP by activities (NACE classification) combined with employment data. Data 
on GDP are available in nominal values and as an index series (2000 = 100) for GDP in 
real terms from which growth rates are calculated. Employment data are either based on 
the Labour Force Survey (which was the primary source used in the analysis below), 
according to SNA methodology (which would be available only for Macedonia and 
Slovenia) or based on registered employment data. The latter source has to be used for 
Albania as LFS data are not available for this country. A potential problem in mixing these 
data sources is that they differ (sometimes significantly) in terms of employment levels 66 
reported. However, as the analysis below is based on changes in the levels of 
employment, i.e. growth rates, this renders the problem less severe. Nonetheless, when 
comparing the results across countries one should bear in mind these potential data 
problems. With respect to wage data we used time series of nominal gross monthly wages 
for all countries (for Albania public sector wages). Note that in some cases there are also 
methodological breaks in the series over time. Although we tried to make the data as 
consistent as possible over time and across countries, these potential caveats should be 
kept in mind when drawing conclusions from these results. 
 
To calculate the differences between the growth rate of real wages and productivity we 
proceeded as follows: First we calculate the growth rate of labour productivity gLP as the 
difference between the growth rate of real GDP (based on the GDP index), denoted by 
gRGDP, and the growth rate of employment gEMP, i.e. 
 
gLP = gRGDP-gEMP    (1) 
 
Second, we construct growth rates of real wages by subtracting the growth rate of the price 
level gP from the growth of nominal wages (gross monthly wages) denoted by gNGMW, 
thus 
 
gRW = gNGMW – gP.    (2) 
 
The growth rate of the price level was itself calculated by subtracting the growth rate of real 
GDP from the growth rate of nominal GDP. This then allows calculating the difference of 
labour productivity and real wages,  
 
D = gLP – gRW    (3) 
 
which is the important variable we shall look at.  
 
Results at the total economy level 
In principle this exercise could be done on a year-by-year basis. However, we will present 
the results at the total economy level for two arbitrarily chosen sub-periods, 2001-2003 and 
2004-2006, in Figure 13. The underlying growth rates of the components discussed above 
can be found in Appendix Table A.2. 
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Figure 13 
Difference between average annual labour productivity growth and real wage growth,  
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Amongst the group of peer countries, Slovenia shows a very balanced pattern of 
productivity and real wage growth. The difference between productivity and real wage 
growth was slightly positive in both periods, with 1 percentage point and 0.2 percentage 
points difference respectively. In Romania productivity growth was much higher than real 
wage growth in the period 2001-2003. This period was characterized by labour productivity 
growth of around 9 per cent per annum driven by relatively high real GDP growth (5.5 per 
cent) together with negative employment growth (-4.4 per cent; all per annum). Nominal 
wages and the price level have been growing at very similar rates with the former being 
slightly higher, implying positive but modest real wage growth. The difference however 
turned slightly negative in the period 2004-2006, mainly due to rather high real wage 
growth at about the rate of growth of productivity (about 6 per cent). The strong labour 
productivity growth was driven by real GDP growth at constant employment levels. Finally, 
in Bulgaria also a slightly positive difference of about 1 percentage point in the first period 68 
can be observed; in general, this period was characterized by a relatively balanced pattern 
of growth with respect to all of the variables considered here. The difference became 
negative in the following subperiod 2004-2006, mainly caused by lower productivity growth 
(due to rather high employment growth) and nominal wage growth lying one percentage 
point above the change in the price level. 
 
With respect to the Western Balkan countries, two striking patterns are emerging: First, 
real wage growth seemed to be much stronger than productivity growth in Montenegro and 
Serbia over the period 2001-2004. In Albania and Croatia labour productivity growth was 
above real wage growth, whereas in Macedonia the difference was only marginal. The 
second striking fact is that in all these countries – with the exception of Albania – the 
difference became positive in the subperiod 2004-2006 and in some cases labour 
productivity growth was well above real wage growth. Let us discuss these patterns on a 
country-by-country basis. 
 
In Albania this occurred despite high real wage growth (8.5 per cent) but even higher 
productivity growth (10.7 per cent) due to declining employment levels. Further, price level 
changes have been rather modest, at about 3.3 per cent. In the next subperiod, 
2004-2006, this pattern changed mainly driven by a lower productivity growth rate, 
dropping from about 10 to 5 per cent, whereas most of the other (nominal) variables were 
growing at more or less the same rates as in the subperiod 2001-2003.  
 
For Bosnia and Herzegovina no data are available for the first subperiod. In the second 
subperiod, labour productivity grew rather modestly at 4.4 per cent; however, real wages 
were stagnant as nominal wages grew by the same magnitude as the price level. 
 
In Croatia labour productivity outstripped real wage growth in both subperiods considered. 
The difference, however, became smaller in the second period. The main reason for this 
was the decline in labour productivity growth caused by rising employment levels whereas 
the growth rates of the other variables were more or less in line with the period before. One 
should note here that employment has started to pick up in the recent period which may 
represent a difference to the other countries considered here. 
 
In Macedonia real wage growth and productivity growth balanced each other in the first 
subperiod; in the second subperiod productivity growth became stronger, implying a small 
but positive value for the difference. The first subperiod was characterized by stagnant 
labour productivity as basically both output and employment were stagnant. Further, prices 
and nominal wages were growing at similar and modest rates (around 3 per cent). In the 
second subperiod productivity growth jumped to 6 per cent due to relatively strong output 
growth combined with a decline in overall employment. This was sufficient to more than 
compensate the also strongly increasing real wages by about 5 per cent due to high 69 
nominal wage growth of about 11 per cent; the growth rate of the price level also doubled 
from about 3 to 6 per cent. 
 
In the remaining two countries – Montenegro and Serbia – real wage growth was much 
higher than productivity growth in the first subperiod 2001-2003; this development reversed 
however in the second subperiod. In Montenegro the high real wage growth was fuelled by 
huge increases in nominal wages (the growth rate was 20 per cent, counteracted by an 
increase in the price level at a rate of 10 per cent). Labour productivity, by contrast, was 
almost zero as the economy declined in this period (growth rate of -1 per cent) with 
employment declining slightly more (-2 per cent growth rate) than GDP. In the second 
subperiod 2004-2006 nominal wage growth dropped sharply to a rate of about 4 per cent 
and was thus in line with changes in the price levels. Consequently, this implies almost 
constant real wages. At the same time labour productivity started to increase at rather 
modest rates of about 1.4 per cent growth only. Real GDP grew at about 3 per cent; but as 
employment increased as well, by about 1.5 per cent, labour productivity growth was 
modest. However, combined with constant real wages this was sufficient to attain a 
positive difference. 
 
Finally, in Serbia the negative bar in the first period was mainly caused by very high 
nominal wage increases. Although the high growth rate was partly absorbed by large 
changes in the price level as well, the real wage outcome overcompensated the not too 
bad labour productivity growth of almost 6 per cent. In the second subperiod the growth 
rates of nominal wages and price levels almost dropped by half. This implied that the 
growth rate of real wages also halved and is now at about 8 per cent. At the same time 
labour productivity growth doubled from 5.7 to about 10 per cent. This was driven by 
stronger real GDP growth combined with strong declines of employment.  
 
Results by types of industry 
The database also allows to conduct a similar analysis at the level of industries.
32 Data for 
most countries are available at the NACE rev. 1.1. 1-digit level or slightly less aggregated 
for some countries. In order to be able to draw a comparative picture of the productivity-
real wage growth pattern across countries, we first calculated the growth rates at the most 
detailed industry level for each country. We shall, however, show the differences in 
productivity and real wage growth at a less detailed level covering six broad industry types; 
this helps the qualitative interpretation of the results. In order to obtain the growth rates at 
the more aggregate sector levels, we calculated the weighted average of the growth rates 
using average nominal value added shares over the period considered as weights. Due to 
data constraints we are able to present results over the period 2004-2006 only. The 
industry aggregates chosen are presented in Table 17. 
                                                           
32   Note that we shall stick to the term ‘real wages’ defined as nominal wage growth in this particular industry minus the 
change in the price level of this particular industry. A more proper term would be ‘product wage’. 70 
Table 17 
Industry classification 
NACE Description  Industry type 
A  Agriculture, hunting and forestry  Agriculture 
B  Fishing    
D Manufacturing  Manufacturing 
J  Financial intermediation 
Business 
Services 
K  Real estate, renting and business activities    
F  Construction  Other Activities 
G 
Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles, motorcycles and personal and 
household goods   
H  Hotels and restaurants   
I  Transport, storage and communication    
C  Mining and quarrying 
Mining and 
Energy 
E  Electricity, gas and water supply    
L  Public administration and defence; compulsory social security  Public Services 
M  Education   
N  Health and social work    
T     Total 
 
The first three aggregates (Agriculture, Manufacturing and Business Services) can be 
classified as tradables, the last two (Mining and Energy and Public Services) can be looked 
at as mostly publicly provided service activities. The category Other Activities summarizes 
other industries including service activities mostly provided privately and other goods that 
are not tradable (or only to a limited extent). Table 18 presents the average shares of GDP. 
The share of manufacturing is between 20 and 25 per cent for most countries; only 
Montenegro and Serbia show much lower shares with 10 and 17.5 per cent, respectively. 
The share of Business Services ranges from a minimum of 7.7 per cent in Macedonia to 
15 to 20 per cent or slightly more in the other countries. The share of Mining and Energy is 
generally relatively low, between 3.5 to 8 per cent. Finally, the share of Public services 
ranges from 13 per cent in Romania to 21 per cent in Montenegro.  
 
Table 18 
Average nominal share in GDP, 2004-2006 
 Bulgaria  Romania  Slovenia Albania
Bosnia-
Herzegovina Croatia Macedonia Montenegro Serbia
Agriculture n.a.  11.1  2.5 n.a. n.a. 7.6 13.8  10.8  12.2
Manufacturing 20.4  22.8  25.2 n.a. n.a. 19.4 19.5  10.1  17.5
Business Services  23.4  15.1  22.4 n.a. n.a. 17.2 7.7  17.9  20.0
Other Activities  33.3  33.8  28.7 n.a. n.a. 35.6 36.0  32.7  26.8
Mining, Energy  7.5  4.0  3.6 n.a. n.a. 4.0 5.2  7.7  6.4
Public Services  15.5  13.3  17.6 n.a. n.a. 16.1 17.7  20.8  17.1
Note: Shares in Bulgaria do not include Agriculture. 71 
Before turning to the results let us mention that the analysis might suffer from 
measurement problems which are problematic to different degrees across the sectors. In 
particular, productivity measures are less reliable in service activities and especially in 
Public Services; this is also the case for measuring price developments. Further, wage 
developments might also be driven by differences in skill composition of the workforce in 
the particular sectors which we are not able to take into account here. 
 
The results of the differences are presented in Figures 14a to 14c for the group of peer 
countries. As before, we present growth rates for other components in Table  A.3. The 
general pattern in these countries is that tradables in most cases show a negative bar, 
which means that real wage growth was stronger than productivity growth. This is mainly 
the case for Business Services in Romania, primarily caused by strong negative 
productivity growth in this industry aggregate, and at a lower magnitude for Bulgaria, also 
facing slightly negative productivity growth in this industry
33. In both countries for which 
data are available (Romania and Slovenia) the difference in Agriculture was negative as 























Note: No data available for Agriculture. 
                                                           
33   The calculated negative productivity growth in business services reflects the calculation of productivity as output at 
constant prices divided by employment. This way of calculating productivity growth has weaknesses when there are 
quality improvements in the services provided (reflected also in relative price increases) which then get deflated out of 
the output measure. Also for the advanced OECD countries, such negative productivity growth for Business Services 
has been recorded when productivity is calculated in this way; see, e.g., OECD Outlook (2007).  72 
Figure 14b 







































Notes: Fishing not included in Agriculture. 73 
With respect to publicly provided services, Mining and Energy and Public Services, in 
Bulgaria nominal wage growth was more or less in line with the growth rate at the total 
economy level. In Romania nominal wage growth was above that in the total economy and 
particularly so in Public Services. In Slovenia, by contrast, nominal wage growth in Public 
Services was below average whereas the growth rate in Mining and Energy was above 
average (see Table A.3). In all countries labour productivity growth was slower than real 
wage growth in both sectors, with the exception of Mining and Energy in Bulgaria due to 
negative real wage growth itself caused by a strong increase in the price level in this industry. 
 
Let us now turn to the group of Western Balkan countries for which we present results in 
Figures 15a to 15e. As already outlined above, the difference between productivity and real 
wage growth was much more pronounced in this group of countries over the period 
2004-2006 when compared to the group of peer countries (see Figure 14 above). With 
respect to industry patterns, one striking difference in the comparison with the peer 
countries is that productivity growth in the tradable sectors (Agriculture, Manufacturing and 
Business services) was in most cases above real wage growth. Exceptions to this are 
Albania, where particularly high nominal wage growth can be observed, the Business 
Services sector in Croatia, which was characterized by strong negative productivity growth 
but also slightly negative real wage growth, and Manufacturing in Montenegro, where high 
nominal wage growth (16 per cent) implied high real wage (14 per cent) growth 
outstripping also the high labour productivity growth (11 per cent) in this sector. 
 
In public services (sectors Mining and Energy and Public Services) we again find a 
differentiated pattern of nominal wage growth compared with growth at the total economy 
level (see Table A.4). In Croatia nominal wage growth was largely in line with that in the 
overall economy (slightly higher in Mining and Energy but lower in Public services). In 
Macedonia and Montenegro nominal wages grew much faster in Mining and Energy, and 
in Public services in the case of Macedonia. In Serbia nominal wage growth was slightly 
below the national average in both sectors.  
 
In Croatia the Mining and Energy sector was characterized by very high productivity growth 
combined with a decline in real wages caused by high price increases which explains the 
large positive difference between productivity and real wage growth. In Public services both 
labour productivity and real wages declined slightly, the latter even a somewhat faster.  
 
In Macedonia the relatively high nominal wage growth in Mining and Energy also resulted 
in high real wage growth as the price level declined in this sector. Combined with slightly 
negative productivity growth this renders the difference strongly negative. In Public 
services real wage growth was rather modest; however, as labour productivity growth was 
slightly negative the difference is again negative. In Montenegro the situation was similar 
as in Macedonia in Mining and Energy. High nominal wage growth led to high real wage 74 
growth as the price level was almost constant. Thus real wage growth at 18 per cent 
outstripped the very high productivity growth of 13 per cent mainly caused by a large 
decline in employment (-13 per cent). Labour productivity growth in Public services also 
was high mainly because of a similar decline in employment as real wages were growing 
negatively due to a rather strong increase in the prices of public services and modest 
nominal wage growth. 
 
Finally, in Serbia the difference between labour productivity and real wage growth is less 
pronounced in the public services sectors, being slightly negative in Mining and Energy 
and positive in Public services. In Mining and Energy the negative productivity growth 
outstripped the negative growth of real wages. In Public services productivity was growing 
due to a decline in employment and almost constant output growth whereas real wages 
were almost stagnant.  
 
Figure 15a 













Note: Hotels and Restaurants (H) not included in Other services. 
Figure 15b 




















































































In the remaining industry group Other services, labour productivity growth was stronger 
than real wage growth in Serbia and only marginally so in Croatia and Macedonia as well 
as in Albania. Only in Montenegro did real wages grow faster as labour productivity growth 
was only at one per cent.  
 
Summarizing, in the tradable sectors as well as in industry group Other services, the 
Balkan economies did reasonably well over the period, in that labour productivity growth 
was above real wage growth in most cases. In the sectors providing public goods the 
evidence is rather mixed: In Mining and Energy only Croatia (where the oil company is 
registered in this industry) does show a pattern of labour productivity being higher than real 
wage growth due to strong price and productivity increases and a decline in real wages. 
Macedonia and Serbia are characterized by low price increases in this sector and negative 
labour productivity growth. However, whereas in Macedonia nominal wage growth also 
caused high real wage growth, the latter has been slightly negative in Serbia. Combined 
with sluggish productivity growth this rendered the differential negative. The negative 
differential in Montenegro, by contrast, has been caused largely by strong real wage 
growth outstripping the also high labour productivity growth. Finally, the differential in Public 
services has been positive in all countries with the exception of Macedonia, caused by 
relatively high real wage growth combined with even slightly negative productivity growth.  
 
2.2.4.2 Results from the VAR analysis 
Aggregate nominal and real wage flexibility is important under fixed exchange rates as this 
serves as an important adjustment mechanism to substitute for adjustments of the nominal 
exchange rate. 
 
In this part we investigate flexibility of real and nominal wages in the peer countries Bulgaria, 
Romania, Slovenia and the group of countries including Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, 
Montenegro, Macedonia, and Serbia.
34 Moore and Pentecoast (2005) estimated a structural 
VAR model for eight EU member states including the accession countries Czech Republic, 
Poland, Hungary and the Slovak Republic. They imposed a long-run restriction such that 
nominal shocks do not have an long-run effect on real wages. Such a restriction would be 
compatible with an approach implying a natural rate of unemployment in neoclassical 
theory. However, instead of imposing a restriction we opt for estimating an unrestricted 
vector autoregressive model. The main reason for this is that potential long-term restrictions 
cannot to be justified from an economic point of view for the labour markets and the 
economic performance in the transition countries under consideration.
35 On the other hand, 
the unrestricted VAR still possesses useful statistical properties (see Lütkepohl and Krätzig, 
                                                           
34   Albania could not be included due to data constraints. 
35   For example, Moore and Pentecoast (2005) impose the restriction of a long-run neutrality of nominal shocks on the real 
wage rate; such a restriction is consistent with the hypothesis of the natural rate of unemployment. 77 
2004, and Enders, 1995, for technical details). This is in line with the critique on identifying 
restrictions in general by Sim (1980).  
 
The data we use are taken from the wiiw Monthly Database, providing data on average 
gross monthly wages and the consumer price index (December 2002 = 100). Using this 
information the real wage series in log levels have been constructed by subtraction. 
Whereas for the group of peer countries the time series starts with January 1995, the data 
for the other countries start much later (with the exception of Croatia). The last available 
observation is December 2007 (see Table 19). The quality of the data regarding number of 
observations and potential structural breaks in particular is a matter of concern in this 
analysis; these might give a bias to the estimated parameters. However due to short time 
series and the general economic situation it is impossible to deal with the related problems 
properly. Although we did a number of robustness checks this implies that results have to 
be interpreted cautiously. Results seem to be robust – at least in a qualitative sense - to 




     Average  monthly  growth  rates 
 Begin End Nominal  wages  Real  wages
Bulgaria 1997m06 2007m12 0.95  0.35
Romania 1995m01 2007m12 2.81  0.20
Slovenia 1995m01 2007m12 0.71  0.51
Bosnia-Herzegovina 2002m09 2007m12 0.65  0.39
Croatia 1995m01 2007m12 0.63  0.32
Macedonia 2004m01 2007m12 0.51  0.36
Montenegro 2004m01 2007m12 1.55  1.09
Serbia 2003m01 2007m12 2.13  1.24
 
 
The table also shows the average monthly growth rates which are also plotted in 
Figure 16. The real growth rates are below 0.5 per cent in all countries with the exception 
of Montenegro and Serbia where we find much higher rates of above 1 per cent. The 
growth rates of nominal wages differ much more, ranging from more than 2.5 per cent in 
Romania to about 0.5 per cent in Macedonia. Note however that these growth rates are 
based on different time periods considered.  
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Figure 16 
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Note: Time span covered differs depending on data availability. 
The concern is whether the group of Western Balkan countries shows a different behaviour 
with respect to the response of nominal and real wages to shocks as compared to the 
group of peer countries. We estimating a VAR model on the first differences of nominal 
and real wages and calculate cumulative impulse response functions to see which longer-
run effects these shocks have. We applied Dickey-Fuller unit root tests using various 
specifications (in particular regarding lag length). In almost all cases we cannot reject the 
null of a unit root implying the series to be integrated of order 1. Similarly, we applied the 
Johansen test for cointegration again using different lag lengths. Again, in almost all cases 
the null of no cointegration has been rejected. In particular, we are interested in whether 
the behaviour of the nominal and real wages is different in these two groups of countries.  
 
However, one should be aware of potential data problems mentioned above. Second, it is 
not straightforward to use this kind of time series analysis for proper cross-country 
comparisons without proper knowledge of the data generating process. Nonetheless, we 
can gain some insights on the flexibility of wages and differences across countries in a 
qualitative manner. A second aspect concerns specific assumptions about the underlying 
data generating process. We proceed in the following way: For each country we estimated 
a VAR model with 3, 6 and 12 lags initially. Further, we also use automatic model selection 
procedures to specify the proper model using standard information criteria. In most cases 
this selection procedure suggested 8 to 12 lags. The qualitative results presented below 
are qualitatively similar to different numbers of lags. We present results using 12 lags (for 
Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia with only 3 lags due to the short time series).
36 Using 
these estimations of the VAR we present the impulse response function using 
orthogonalized shocks based on the Cholesky decomposition. The commonly known 
                                                           
36   We also tested for autocorrelation in the residuals applying the Lagrange multiplier test. The null hypothesis that 
there is no autocorrelation in the residuals cannot be rejected apart in very few cases (regarding lag length); thus 
there is no hint of model misspecification. However, the tests for normality of the residuals (Jarque-Bera, Skewness 
test, Kurtosis test) are less conclusive. For some countries (in particular Romania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and 
Croatia) the hypothesis of normal distribution of residuals has to be rejected at least for one of the tests applied. 79 
problem with this procedure is that this decomposition is based on the ordering of 
variables. To cope with this we also tried the reversed ordering for these two variables as a 
robustness check. Results would indicate the same general conclusions. The results show 
whether there is a longer-run effect on the growth rates of nominal and real wages. Further 
we present the cumulative impulse-response functions on unit shocks to check whether the 
response to a shock grows or diminishes over time and to what extent; this can be 
interpreted as the effect on the levels of nominal and real wages. For example, for a unitary 
nominal shock on nominal wages the response of the nominal wages could be a further 
increase (i.e. becoming cumulatively larger than one), remain at one (i.e. no further effect), 
or decline.  
 
Figures 17a to 17h present the first set of graphs for the orthogonalized impulse response 
functions for the peer countries. These are based on VAR estimations using 12 lags, apart 
for Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia where we used 3 lags due to the short time series. 
The upper left panel shows the impulse response of nominal wage shocks on nominal 
wages. As one can see, the effects die out fairly quickly in all countries so that the 
response after 2 periods is rather small. Similarly, the upper right panel presents the effects 
of a nominal shock on the real wage growth. Again, the effect diminishes quickly in all 
countries. The nominal shock has a negative effect on real wage growth in the first period. 
There might be a slight difference when comparing the peer countries with the other 
countries so that the response remains slightly below the zero line for the first group, 
whereas fluctuating around zero for the Western Balkan countries. But taking the 
confidence band into account this difference is not significant. A shock on real wage growth 
exhibits a small negative effect on nominal wage growth in Romania (in the first periods) 
and Slovenia. In the other countries the responses are mixed although being often positive 
for the first periods after the shocks (one exception being Serbia). Finally, a shock on real 
wage growth also subsides relatively fast in all countries, but again there is some 
fluctuation around the zero line. From this exercise one might conclude that there is no 
substantial difference between the group of peer countries and the group of Western 
Balkan countries with respect to the effects of shocks on nominal or real wage growth. 
However, this exercise is not conclusive as to whether such shocks have some level 
effects. We will turn to this issue next. 
 
In Table 20 we present the results based on the automatic model reduction approach.
37 As 
already mentioned above, we present the cumulative impulse-response functions on unit 
shocks to check whether the response to a shock grows or diminishes over time. The 
results can be interpreted as the effect on the levels of nominal and/or real wages. For 
example, for a unitary nominal shock on nominal wages the response of the nominal 
wages could be a further increase (i.e. becoming cumulatively larger than one), remain at 
                                                           
37   The calculations have been performed using PCGive12. These results are not strictly comparable to the ones reported 
above as we used the automatic model selection procedure. 80 
one (i.e. no further effect), or decline. Note that the results presented are more of a 
qualitative nature as the cumulative impulse response functions still fluctuate around a 
certain more or less constant level, which is presented in Table 20 below. Further, as in 
most cases the impulse response functions are insignificantly different from zero, the 
cumulative responses might be insignificantly different from zero as well. 
 
With respect to the effect of a nominal wage shock on nominal wages we see that in most 
countries the cumulated effect is even lower than one or only slightly above one (Bulgaria 
and Croatia). Notable exceptions are Romania (showing rather strong nominal wage 
growth) and Slovenia. The effect of a unitary nominal wage shock on real wages is 
negative in most countries (reflecting a relatively strong reaction in the price level). The 
magnitudes are, however, relatively small (and in most cases between zero and 1). 
Exceptions are Slovenia with a slightly positive accumulated response and Romania with a 
stronger negative one.  
 
The effects of a one unit real wage shock on nominal wages might be expected to be 
negative (as a real wage increase might be followed by lower pressure on nominal wages). 
This is what we actually find for most countries, such as Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia, 
Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia. For Slovenia we observe a small positive effect and 
for Bosnia and Herzegovina no effect. Finally, the effects of a real wage shock on real 
wages are in most cases not increasing over time and are even less than one in most of 
the Western Balkan countries, with accumulated effects between 0.6 and 0.9. The only 
exception is Macedonia where real wages remain at the higher level after the shock. For 
the set of peer countries the effects are quite different. Whereas Bulgaria is in line with the 
Western Balkan countries, Romania shows a strong positive effect. Only in Slovenia does 
the effect of a real wage shock die down over time.  81 
Figure 17a 
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Figure 17c  
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Cumulative responses to one unit shocks 
  Bulgaria Romania Slovenia
Bosnia-
Herzegovina Croatia Macedonia Montenegro  Serbia
nominal wage  nominal wage 1.25  4.50 2.00 0.70 1.20 0.80  0.70  0.80
real wage  nominal wage -0.25  -2.00 0.10 0.00 -0.60 -0.30  -0.30  -0.20
nominal wage  real wage  0.20  -4.00 -1.50 -0.01 -0.60 0.00  -0.15  -0.40
real wage  real wage  1.00  2.20 0.00 0.60 0.90 1.00  0.90  0.60
initial number of lags  12  12 12 12 12 3  3  3
Number of steps  150  150 150 150 150 50  50  50
 
 
Summarizing, wage responses to shocks in the Western Balkan countries do not seem to 
be a matter of much concern based on the results just presented. They are in line with the 
magnitudes observed for the group of peer countries or even better, although there are 
some exception. However, one should be aware that these conclusions are based on a 
particular statistical approach and may be prone to some statistical problems caused by 
the quality of the underlying data series. Nonetheless, the results obtained shed some light 
on wage setting behaviour in this group of countries. 
 
 
2.3  Country-by-country assessment of the likely impacts of the removal of 
labour market rigidities on adjustment capacities to shocks  
2.3.1  Country-specific assessments of main risks and stability issues  
Literature reviews of the OCA theory and the available empirical studies suggest the 
following criteria that could be helpful in understanding the possible risks to GDP and 
employment that emanate from nominal, i.e., exchange rate rigidity. The list will be useful 
to discuss the shocks that different countries may experience and to structure the country-
by-country recommendations around. 
(i)  Specialization of production. In most countries of the Western Balkans, one or the 
other sector is the most important one or more important than the rest of the 
economy. Thus, these countries are prone to asymmetric shocks. 
(ii)  Specialization of exports. One way to determine whether a country has specialized is 
to check the structure of its exports. Studies of export specialization of countries in 
the Western Balkans suggest that the latter are highly specialized in exports and 
diverse in imports. 
(iii)  Labour market flexibility: wages, mobility, structural features. Most studies of the 
economies in the Western Balkans suggest that formal wage and employment 
flexibilities are low, but actual flexibility of the labour markets is high. Similarly, 
mobility, in particular cross-border mobility, is relatively high and for many countries it 86 
is the world labour market that is relevant. That does have significant consequences 
for the level of wages and also for employment. 
(iv)  The scope of fiscal policy, e.g., what are the constraints on discretionary fiscal policy: 
As a rule, Balkan countries do not face too many constraints on pursuing 
discretionary fiscal policies. 
(v)  Financial integration: foreign exchange reserves, indexation, foreign investments, 
openness of the capital account: High asset and liability dollarization is a very 
important characteristic of the Western Balkans. 
(vi)  Risk convergence (on public and private debt): Western Balkan countries tend to 
feature higher risks on both private and public debts, but it is not clear whether the 
risk assessment is systematically distorted; in most cases, the risk differential 
correctly assesses the risks of lending to both public and private debtors. 
(vii)  Inflation convergence: Until recently, inflation has mostly converged to the euro level, 
except in countries with a flexible exchange rate such as Serbia. In that respect, real 
exchange rate appreciation has been relatively mild and is certainly covered by the 
difference in productivity developments.  
(viii)  Productivity growth and wage inflation: The key equilibrating condition is whether 
wages are outpacing productivity. In some cases, e.g., Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
growth of wages in the public sector is not fully covered by productivity. In Serbia, 
wages are growing faster than productivity both in the public and in the corporate 
sector, in industry and in services.  
(ix)  Balassa-Samuelson effect (wage inflation in the services sector). The fast growth of 
services and relatively high competition in that sector, which is mostly characterized 
by constant returns to scale and is also partly informal, suggest that a strong 
Balassa-Samuelson effect should not be expected to be found. Indeed, empirical 
tests do not as a rule find that wages in the non-tradable sector are growing faster 
than productivity or faster than those in the tradable sector. This could change once 
the labour market tightens. 
 
Overall assessment 
The Western Balkan countries are facing significant macroeconomic disequilibria. The two 
most important ones are in the external sector and in the labour markets. These are not 
unconnected, though the connection is not as straightforward as it may seem because of 
the factors specific to transition that are structural or rather connected with structural 
changes. Therefore, in the long run, these disequilibria may prove to be correctable and 
thus sustainable. In the short run, however, they may present problems for stabilization 
policies if these countries are faced with external or internal shocks. In order to improve 
short-term stability and medium-term sustainability, policies to address the disequilibria and 
the structural challenges should be devised and implemented. 
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Having in mind a state of macroeconomic stability and sustainability of imbalances, 
discussed in the introduction and illustrated by figures there and in Table 21, the risks that 
these imbalances may bring about in the short and medium term should be assessed 
qualitatively and, to the extent possible, quantitatively and policy responses should be 
considered and recommended. 
The overall assessment of sources of short-term shocks can be found in Matrix 1. The 
classification of sources of risks follows from the theoretical considerations summarized at 
the beginning of this section. Risk assessment within the table comes from the findings of 
this study and from other studies of sensitivity to shocks of the countries in this region 
(Sorsa, Bakker, Duenwald, Maechler and Tiffin, 2007 and Maechler, Mitra and Worrell, 
2007). Also, the experience of transition is relied on to rank possible risks to 
macroeconomic stability.  
 
There is no canonical model for risk assessment to stability and sustainability of 
imbalances in economies in transition and in general. The main worry is that of a sudden 
stop type of crisis in the short run and that of exchange rate misalignment in the medium 
run. In both cases, the effects on labour markets are crucially important and thus the 
assessment of labour market institutions and policies are important. In that context, 
country-specific assessments and recommendations are needed. 
 
Table 21 indicates that external imbalances are the main problem in the region as a whole. 
Labour markets are showing signs of improvement in a number of countries, though public 
sector leadership when it comes to wage setting is rather pervasive. Also, informal markets 
are important for employment. Fiscal sustainability does not seem to present significant 
problems, which is not to say that public sectors and public finances are not in need of 
reform and restructuring. Wage setting is problematic in most cases because of the 
leadership role that the public sector plays. However, the most important problem is 
continuous decline in employment or slow growth of employment and the fact that the 
public sector is still such an important employer. 
 
Assessing the significance of the external imbalances is not easy because the reasons for 
their persistence are both on the trade and on the foreign investment sides. Export 
capacity of the Western Balkan countries is low at the moment while the inflow of foreign 
finance is relatively strong. Therefore, short-term risks, those that are induced by external 
or internal shocks, depend on the availability of foreign financial resources while medium-
term sustainability depends on the growth of exports. Other problems and disequilibria do 
not seem to contribute too much to either risks or sustainability.  
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Table 21 
Risk factors and sustainability issues, by country  
Disequilibrium issues 
                     Employment growth 
 External  Fiscal  Inflation Wages  Aggregate  Sectoral 
 disequilibria  Sustainability public/private   employment
   services/ind.   patterns
     public/private
Albania  sustainable  sustainable stable efficient slow  mostly private, informal
Bosnia & Herzegovina  Risky, sustainable 
Risky, 
sustainable stable public leadership slow  public, informal
Croatia  risky  sustainable rising, stable public leadership  Improving  public, services
Kosovo Severe  sustainable stable public,  informal stable (level very low)  public, services
Macedonia sustainable  sustainable rising,  stable public, informal very slow  public, informal





sustainable rising public leadership declining  public, informal
Bulgaria risky  sustainable rising private  leadership strong  Private




Country by country assessments 
Though there are common features in the Western Balkans, the diversity is certainly the 
main characteristic both from the macroeconomic and the microeconomic points of view. 
One common characteristic is that it is hard for these countries to adopt any other but 
some type of a fixed exchange rate regime. The reason is low credibility of the central 
banks and thus high level of currency substitution, with the euro being the preferred 
currency. However, when it comes to other policy alternatives, diversity is significant and 
policy recommendations need to be country-specific. This is true of labour and social 
policies too. 
 
The country-specific recommendations are based on the results of this study and also on 
the country studies that were commissioned and prepared for in the context of this project 
(these are available as a separate set of papers). Clearly, there are many common 
features in policy recommendations because the policy instruments are limited. However, 
the combination and the sequencing of their implementation may differ from country to 
country. 
 
The main labour market issues can be classified as those that have to do with wage 
setting, employment development, the problems with unemployment, and with the informal 
sector. These problems have a short-term and a medium-term aspect, which can be 
classified as risks and sustainability issues. That leads to the following matrix: 89 
 
Matrix of labour market problems 
 Wages  employment  unemployment  informalities 
risks        
sustainability        
 
Croatia 
The key problem of the Croatian labour market is that there are indications that the level of 
wages is higher than is consistent with the level of the exchange rate. In addition, the 
development of wages seems to follow the political cycle. Finally, the public sector wages 
tend to lead the overall wage setting. 
 wages  employment  unemployment informalities 
risks stabilization  further  deregulation  less  benefits  fiscal  discipline 
sustainability  income policy  active labour market policies  not a medium-term problem  tax policy 
 
In the short term, there are risks that emanate from rising inflation. In the context of soft 
political response to wage pressures, that may lead to a wage-price-wage spiral. Thus, 
price stabilization is the key short-term instrument. Short-term employment problems could 
be addressed by further deregulation especially when it comes to collective dismissals 
while some of the unemployment problems could be alleviated with the restructuring of 
benefits (direct and indirect). Informality could be brought down even further with stricter 
fiscal discipline.  
 
Sustainability: In the context of the chosen exchange rate regime, wage setting in the 
medium run could be delegated to the social consensus to arrive at an income policy 
similar to that in neighbouring Slovenia. These two countries are similar with respect to the 
high level of public sector employment. Given that public sector wage setting leads the 
private sector wages, incomes policies should not be difficult to devise and implement. 
When it comes to employment, Croatia is a country that could benefit from active labour 
market policies. The problem is the level of employment and that is a structural issue best 
addressed by training and retraining. Unemployment should not be a problem in the 
medium run, if forced macroeconomic adjustment is avoided. When it comes to 
informalities, the Croatian experience is that the optimization of tax policy leads to lower 
informal employment. Generally, reliance on VAT rather than on direct taxes leads to lower 
informal employment. Similarly, social security reforms would bring incentives for less 
informality in the labour market. 90 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 
 Wages  employment  unemployment  Informalities 
risks  cap on public sector wages  deregulation and 
mobility 
lower benefits  good governance 








In the short run, the key risk in Bosnia and Herzegovina, especially in the Federation, is the 
wage push in the public sector (Kristić, 2007). Because of the complex political set-up of 
this country, the most effective short-term incomes policy would be a cap on public sector 
wages. As for employment, the most effective short-term measures would be deregulation 
and higher mobility. As for unemployment, a decrease in benefits would be useful. Unlike 
Croatia, informal markets are supported by problems with governance, i.e., with corruption. 
Thus, good governance is important. 
In the medium run, sustainability of wages requires public sector reform, that is lower 
employment there. Private sector employment is the key to reducing unemployment and 
that depends on overall liberalization and an increase of competition (supporting new 
entry) in the product market: thus, it is a demand rather than a supply problem. When it 
comes to informal labour markets, the main problem is the supply of public services rather 
than the costs, i.e., taxes, that those require. In the medium run, formalization means 
improved public sector efficiency. 
 
Serbia 
 Wages  employment  unemployment  informalities 
risks  Stabilization  better labour market 
institutions 
retraining local  government 
reform  
sustainability labour  market  flexibility private  sector 
development 
regional development  public services 
 
The key short-term issue is wage inflation and the key instrument is stabilization. 
Employment suffers from inefficient labour market institutions, and unemployment risks are 
similar to those in other countries in the early stages of transition: there is a need for 
retraining. The retraining programmes have had poor results so far because those have 
been organized without clear connection to future employment. As an alternative, 
employers could be encouraged to run retraining programmes with the view on future 
employment. Informal markets depend very much on local governments, which tend to be 
less responsive because they depend very much on the central government. Thus, local 
government reform with the aim of them becoming more accountable and responsive 
could improve the situation in the local labour markets.  91 
Sustainability of wages depends on their flexibility in Serbia. There is rigidity in public 
sector wages that lead the wage setting overall. Sustainable growth of employment 
depends decisively on private sector development, while medium-term unemployment 
problems may be connected with regional differences: thus, regional development is the 
key instrument. Bringing down informality in labour markets is connected with better supply 
of public services. 
 
Montenegro 
 Wages  employment  unemployment  Informalities 




retraining good  governance 
sustainability  public sector income 
policies 




Most recent developments are positive, as employment is increasing and unemployment 
decreasing. The worry is that this is a consequence of a bubble in real estate markets. 
Thus, short-term policy should target financial stability and sustainability rather than wages 
outright. Employment generation is in services so there are structural shortages due to lack 
of supply of appropriate skills. Inward migration is a policy option, while greater within-
country mobility is another. Unemployment is the problem of retraining in the short run and it 
could be organized by the government because the services sector is usually not good in 
organizing it by itself. Informalities are mostly the problem of good governance, i.e., of 
corruption.  
 
Wage sustainability is an issue of public sector incomes policy as the private sector is 
highly competitive and should not have wage setting problems. Employment is very much 
connected with regional development while unemployment should not be a problem in the 
medium run. Finally, getting the informal economy to low and sustainable levels will be to a 
significant extent the outcome of improved public services. 
 
Macedonia 
 Wages  employment  unemployment  informalities 




address long term 
unemployment 
good governance 




structural reforms  public services 
 
Macedonia is a country with very high unemployment and significant structural distortions 
of employment. Wage risks were low until recently. In the last year or so, public sector 
wages have gone up strongly. Previously, the cap on public sector wages was working, so 
something similar could be advised. Employment depends very much on demand and that 92 
on product market flexibility: competition policy, market segmentation and barriers to entry 
for new firms. Long-term unemployment is very high and should be addressed in the short 
run by higher demand for temporary employment. The informal labour market is pervasive 
and is very much caused by corruption on all levels. 
 
Wage sustainability is not a problem, while employment can be increased sustainably with 
investments in human capital. This is especially true for women employment. 
Unemployment can be sustainably brought down with structural reforms, more in the 
product than in the labour markets. The informal economy is mostly the consequence of 
the weak state in terms of the services that it supplies. 
 
Albania 
 Wages  employment  unemployment  informalities 
risks Stabilization  outward  migration education  good  governance 
sustainability  not a problem  human capital 
investments 




Short-term risks to wages are on the side of price stability. Migration policies are important 
for employment, and education is the key to reducing unemployment. Informality can be 
addressed with anticorruption policies in the short run. 
 
Wage sustainability should not be a problem in the medium run while employment will 
depend very much on investments in human capital. Unemployment reduction will depend 
on the development of the services sector. Albania could develop a strong tourism sector 
and mimic Montenegro and Croatia in this respect. In the medium run, informality depends 
on the supply of public services. 
 
Kosovo 
 Wages  employment  unemployment  informalities 
risks  too low  outward migration  public investments  Not much to be done in 
the short run 
sustainability  not a problem  private sector 
development 
outward migration  public services 
 
Kosovo is a class of its own. Most of the problems are not really labour market ones. 
Clearly, outward migration would be helpful as would private sector development, which in 
part depends on privatization. Strengthening public sector services and decreasing 
corruption would also be helpful. In general, it is a question of lack of demand and policies 
that address this issue that will be helpful for a sustainable improvement of the labour 
market. 
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2.3.2  Comparison with peers: Bulgaria, Romania, Slovenia 
Slovenia could serve as a model for Croatia especially after it joined the EMU. Though the 
structure of these two economies is different, which is also reflected in the structure of their 
exports, Slovenia faced similar problems with wage inflation and relied on a managed float 
and on social dialogue to put them under control. Croatia is very much committed to its 
fixed exchange rate regime, so it is specifically the incomes policies of Slovenia that it 
could take over. Other countries can hardly imitate Slovenia because the differences are 
too large. 
 
Bulgaria is usually seen as a success story with regard to active labour market policies. 
Another characteristic that has ensured growing employment and macroeconomic stability, 
until recently, has been lack of wage inflation. The main instrument has been a restrictive 
fiscal policy. Macedonia has tried to follow the same policy, but that was in all probability 
inappropriate because of slow growth. Perhaps most similar to Bulgaria is Serbia, because 
of population size and level of development, but labour markets are quite different. Serbia 
has a history of reliance on inflation to control real wages. Also, commitment to fixed 
exchange rates is not strong. Bosnia and Herzegovina has a currency board as does 
Bulgaria, but again their labour markets are quite different.  
 
Romania is in many ways quite different and there are few lessons that it can teach the 
others. It has had low unemployment rates throughout transition and a rather large 
agricultural sector. Also, it is the only country that experiments with inflation targeting. 
There is some apparent similarity with Albania, which also officially implements inflation 
targeting and has a large agricultural sector, but practically everything else is different. 
 
The one lesson that Western Balkan countries can learn from the peer countries is that 
sustained high growth rates are supportive of employment and the reduction of 
unemployment. The other is that the initially favourable environment in terms of price 
developments due to growth of productivity can eventually disappear due to increased 
pressures on wages and to political developments and that this can lead to problems in 
countries with fixed exchange rates. Also, managing large capital inflows may prove to be 
difficult as can be seen in the Baltic countries and also in the peer countries. In the context 
of fixed exchange rates that may lead to slow down of growth and painful structural 
adjustments. These challenges may turn up to be important for some Western Balkan 
countries even in the medium term (e.g., in Croatia and Serbia). 
 
2.3.3 Assessing the impact of loosening employment protection legislation (EPL) 
To evaluate the effect of loosening employment protection legislation, in accordance with 
the findings presented in subsection 2.2.3, we concentrate on changes in the regulation of 
temporary employment and of collective dismissals on the one hand, and on male 94 
unemployment and female employment on the other. In particular, we have calculated the 
changes in male unemployment and female employment to be expected by (1) the 
adoption of the average level of temporary employment protection prevailing in the NMS in 
our sample, at an index value of 1.4, (2) the adoption of the average of this measure 
prevailing in the three peer countries, at an index value of 2.1, and (3) the adoption of a 
level of regulation of collective dismissals typical of the non-EU OECD countries, at an 
index value of 2.6. The second measure coincides with the average protection level for 
temporary employment in the EU-15. As concerns the third measure, we have chosen the 
other OECD countries as a reference group since collective dismissals are in fact more 
strictly regulated in both the old and the new EU members than in the countries considered 
in the Southeast Europe group. We report the expected effects of the above loosening of 
EPL on male unemployment (Table 22) and female employment (Table 23) respectively, 
since our regression analysis shown in section 2.2.3 has shown that EPL matters for these 
outcomes of the labour markets. Additionally, we also calculate the change to be expected 
from the combination of measures (1) and (3) – as a simple sum of the single effects – for 
convenience. We further report the expected effect of an enhancement of the rule of law in 
the SEE countries to the average of the peer countries on female employment, since this 
variable has been found highly relevant in the determination of female employment. In the 
following, we discuss our results country by country.  
 
The following insights apply to all the five countries of Southeast Europe considered. First, 
any measure taken either improves the situation of male workers and harms the females, 
or vice versa. Second, the effects on female employment of change in the regulation of 
temporary contracts, measured in percentage points, are considerably stronger than on 
male unemployment. Third, in contrast, changes in the regulation of collective dismissals 
have very similar results on both male unemployment and female employment, meaning 
that it only has a gender composition effect on employment and unemployment, but leaves 
total employment levels in the population unaffected. This implies as a general rule that, in 
order to improve employment levels of the total population, relaxing the protection of 
temporary contracts has the highest benefits, since it brings more women into employment 
than men into unemployment on average.
38 On the other hand, increasing female 
employment implies the increase of female labour force participation (since we have found 
that the changes in the indices leave female unemployment unaffected). While this may be 
true for the countries in our sample on average, female labour supply in Southeast Europe 
may be less elastic, due to more rigid cultural norms, inflexible demand for home 
production, etc. Therefore, it needs to be kept in mind that the positive effect of loosening 
                                                           
38   Here we use the fact that the shares of males and females in the total population is about the same. This is confirmed 
by data from Eurostat on the working-age population by gender for Albania (2004), Croatia, Macedonia, and Serbia and 
Montenegro (2003 respectively). The countries of Southeast Europe may be affected by selective emigration however 
that is not captured in the population registers. But even then, the analysis of employment and unemployment rates 
remains unaffected if de facto migrants are considered as out of the labour force but are included into the surveys on 
which our data are based.  95 
the protection of temporary contracts on female employment can only be expected if the 
supply of females to the labour market is sufficiently flexible. Similarly, while such a change 
in the protection level of temporary contracts has benefits for female employment that 
outbalance the negative effects on the labour market for males, it needs to be kept in mind 
that in the latter case, this implies an increase in unemployment that may imply some fiscal 
cost. At the same time, our result that male employment is unaffected by changes in 
employment protection legislation implies that increasing male unemployment coincides 
with increasing male participation. On the other hand, non-participation may also imply 
fiscal costs such as pensions for early retirees, veterans etc., and the fiscal costs for 
non-participation may be higher for males than for females.  
 
In summary and considering that the countries of Southeast Europe have particularly large 
gaps vis-à-vis the OECD and EU countries regarding the levels of female employment, 
taking measures in favour of increased female employment seems to be the most 
beneficial choice for any of the countries of Southeast Europe. However, against this 
general rule, country-specific factors as the specific EPL sub-index levels, the particular 
mix of backlogs concerning male and female labour markets, country-specific welfare 
regimes, education levels by gender, factors shaping female labour market supply and 
international alternatives to domestic employment (that are not captured by our regressions 
and are most likely to be reflected by the high rates of non-participation in the emigration 
countries of Southeast Europe) need to be considered as well. 
 
As a further general result, our regressions have revealed that there is a strong positive 
relationship between female employment and institutional features summarized in the 
measure of the rule of law. Such a relationship is not found for male (un-)employment. One 
interpretation could be that the index also reflects the share of the shadow economy. 
However, we do not have convincing grounds to assume that this aspect of the economies 
matters for female employment and not for the labour markets of males. We suggest 
instead that the rule of law index may be correlated with other institutional features such as 
the prevalence of market work (against subsistence activities) and various dimensions of 
gender equality. Our calculations show that improvements in this (admittedly generic) area 
would bring about the highest benefits for the labour markets of Southeast Europe.  
 
Although still poor by international comparison, with regard to male and female 
employment and unemployment respectively, Albania has a relatively favourable situation 
among the Southeast European countries. In 1995, Albania had relatively low levels of 
regulation concerning regular contracts, but the protection of temporary employment was 
comparatively high in an international perspective (but still rather low compared to the other 
countries of Southeast Europe). Regulations on collective dismissals were relatively strictly 
regulated, but at still lower levels than on average in all country groups but the non-EU 
OECD countries. 96 
Table 22 
Predicted effects of a change in EPL on male unemployment 
Male unemployment  AL BH HR  MA  RS 
(A) rate at present  12.9  28.9  12.8  37.0  15.1 
(B) percentage points explained  20.4  20.7  18.3  21.3  21.8 
(C) percentage points unexplained  -7.5  8.2  -5.5  15.7  -6.7 
(D) predicted change, % points   
     (1) epl_temp to NMS-10 level  2.3  2.5  2.1  2.5  2.5 
     (2) epl_temp to peers' avg level  1.3  1.5  1.0  1.5  1.5 
     (3) epl_coll to other OECD avg.  -0.4  -1.2  0.1  -2.3  -2.0 
     (4) 1+3   2.0  1.3  2.2  0.2  0.5 
(E) employment rate after change (B+C+D)           
     (1) epl_temp to NMS-10 level  15.2  31.4  14.9  39.5  17.6 
     (2) epl_temp to peers' avg level  14.2  30.4  13.8  38.5  16.6 
     (3) epl_coll to other OECD avg.  12.5  27.7  12.9  34.7  13.1 
     (4) 1+3  14.9  30.2  15.0  37.2  15.6 
 
Against this background, there seems to be considerable scope for the relaxation of 
regulations protecting temporary employment. Doing so and adopting the average level 
prevailing in the peer countries on average would imply an increase of male unemployment 
by 1.3 percentage points that would coincide with an increase in female employment by 
2.2 percentage points.  
 
Table 23 
Predicted effects of a change in EPL on female employment 
Female employment  AL BH HR  MA  RS 
(A) rate at present  38.3  20.8  46.3  31.3  40.6 
(B) percentage points explained  28.5  30.6  42.9  35.7  30.9 
(C) percentage points unexplained  9.8  -9.8  3.4  -4.4  9.7 
(D) predicted change, % points   
     (1) epl_temp to NMS-10 level  3.8  4.1  3.4  4.1  4.1 
     (2) epl_temp to peers' avg level  2.2  2.4  1.7  2.4  2.4 
     (3) epl_coll to other OECD avg.  -0.4  -1.3  0.1  -2.6  -2.2 
     (4) 1+3   3.4  2.7  3.5  1.5  1.8 
     (5) rule of law to peers' avg level  14.9  12.9  1.6  9.5  14.3 
(E) employment rate after change (B+C+D)   
     (1) epl_temp to NMS-10 level  42.1  24.9  49.7  35.4  44.7 
     (2) epl_temp to peers' avg level  40.5  23.2  48.0  33.7  43.0 
     (3) epl_coll to other OECD avg.  37.9  19.5  46.4  28.7  38.4 
     (4) 1+3  41.7  23.5  49.8  32.8  42.4 
     (5) rule of law to peers' avg level  53.2  33.7  47.9  40.8  54.9 
 
Assuming similar weights, this implies a net employment effect of around 0.5 percentage 
points for the total population. If, however, Albania improved its institutions and 97 
implemented the rule of law in particular to an extent comparable to the peers, this would 
imply an increase of female employment by around 15 percentage points.  
 
Among the countries of the Western Balkans, Bosnia and Herzegovina stands out having 
the poorest labour market performance for both males and females. At the same time, 
regulations are comparatively strict for both temporary employment contracts and collective 
dismissals. The level of EPL strictness for temporary contracts is in fact very similar to that 
of Albania. Therefore, a loosening of the related regulations can be expected to have very 
similar effects. Decreasing the level to an index value prevailing on average in the peers 
would imply a net employment effect for the total population of around 0.5 percentage 
points, similar to the case of Albania. Also similarly, implementing the rule of law at levels 
of the peer countries would enhance female employment by 13 percentage points.  
 
Croatia has regulated permanent and temporary employment comparatively tightly, while 
the EPL index on collective dismissals is relatively low in international comparison. Also, its 
labour market performance for males and females is lagging somewhat behind in 
international comparison but is relatively favourable among the countries of the Western 
Balkans. In fact, employment and unemployment rates of males are similar to the levels in 
Albania, while female employment is higher and unemployment is lower. The benefit of 
changing the regulation of temporary employment in Croatia is minimal. In terms of the rule 
of law, Croatia is relatively advanced (in fact, its index is higher than those of both Bulgaria 
and Romania), so that reaching the average level of the peers (that is larger by the value of 
Slovenia) would also imply only little improvement of female employment.  
 
Macedonian labour markets are among the poorest in the Western Balkans. Male 
employment and female unemployment are at similar levels as in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
– at 46 and 36 per cent respectively – while in terms of male unemployment (37 per cent) 
and female employment (31 per cent) the situation is considerably worse. Macedonia has 
high restrictions on collective dismissals and relatively strict regulations of temporary 
contracts. While a decrease of the former is found to have gender composition effects on 
labour market outcomes, we do not see benefits from relaxing the former in the case of 
Bosnia, since its labour market performance is strikingly poor in the areas of both male 
unemployment and female employment. Relaxing the protection of temporary contracts to 
the average level of the peers would only minimally alleviate the situation, with a net 
employment effect on the total population of 0.5 percentage points. In contrast, female 
employment in Macedonia would benefit from an improvement of the rule of law to the 
peers’ average level by an increase of 10 percentage points.  
 
Finally, in terms of employment protection legislation, Serbia and Montenegro is 
comparable to Macedonia, with particularly strict regulation of collective dismissals, and 
relatively high protection of temporary contracts. In terms of labour market performance, 98 
the country has intermediate levels of employment and unemployment for both genders as 
compared to the other countries of the Western Balkans. Changes in the labour market 
and other institutions considered would have results very similar to those in the other 
countries: decreasing the protection of temporary contracts to the peers’ level would 
provide a net total employment effect of 0.5 percentage points, while enhancing the rule of 
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Employment in manufacturing 
Croatia 










D Manufacturing  -0.99    
15 Manufacture of food products and beverages  -0.24 16.16 17.43  0.13  0.13
16 Manufacture of tobacco products -8.05 0.71 0.34  -0.04  0.04
17 Manufacture of textiles  -5.41 5.02 3.18  -0.18  0.18
18 Manufacture of wearing apparel; dressing and dyeing of fur  -4.50 11.34 7.91  -0.34  0.34
19 Tanning and dressing of leather; manufacture of related articles  -4.83 4.69 3.16  -0.15  0.15
20 Manufacture of wood and products of wood and cork  -0.43 4.71 4.99  0.03  0.03
21 Manufacture of paper and paper products  -2.05 1.94 1.74  -0.02  0.02
22 Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media  1.51 4.26 5.47  0.12  0.12
23 Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products  -3.15 1.77 1.42  -0.03  0.03
24 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products  -3.99 6.44 4.73  -0.17  0.17
25 Manufacture of rubber and plastic products  -0.76 2.91 2.98  0.01  0.01
26 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products  -0.59 5.65 5.88  0.02  0.02
27 Manufacture of basic metals  -3.11 3.32 2.68  -0.06  0.06
28 Manufacture of fabricated metal products, exc. mach. & equip. 3.65 6.34 10.03 0.37 0.37
29 Manufacture and repair of machinery and equipment  -0.80 5.39 5.49  0.01  0.01
30 Manufacture of office, accounting and computing machinery  2.48 0.60 0.84 0.02 0.02
31 Manufacture and repair of electrical machinery and apparatus  -1.34 4.50 4.34  -0.02  0.02
32 Manufacture and repair of radio, TV & communication equip. & apparatus 3.81 1.25 2.01 0.08 0.08
33 Manufacture and repair of medical, precision & optical instruments, 
watches & clocks  -0.58 0.73 0.76 0.00 0.00
34 Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers  1.95 1.05 1.41 0.04 0.04
35 Manufacture and repair of other transport equipment  1.61 5.87 7.61  0.17  0.17
36 Manufacture of furniture; manufacturing n.e.c.  -1.31 4.97 4.81  -0.02  0.02
37 Recycling  6.21 0.39 0.79 0.04 0.04
     1.04
Macedonia 










D Manufacturing  0.40    
15 Manufacture of food products and beverages  1.14 11.51 11.94 0.09 0.09
16 Manufacture of tobacco products -8.35 4.88 3.10  -0.36  0.36
17 Manufacture of textiles  -4.78 7.45 5.71  -0.35  0.35
18 Manufacture of wearing apparel; dressing and dyeing of fur  8.80 20.98 31.36  2.07  2.07
19 Tanning and dressing of leather; manufacture of related articles  -4.60 5.19 4.02  -0.23  0.23
20 Manufacture of wood and products of wood and cork  19.06 1.11 2.60 0.30 0.30
21 Manufacture of paper and paper products  -2.56 1.52 1.31  -0.04  0.04
22 Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media  2.24 2.92 3.20  0.06  0.06
23 Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products  -4.61 1.11 0.86  -0.05  0.05
24 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products  -15.55 6.15 2.59 -0.71  0.71
25 Manufacture of rubber and plastic products  26.19 1.59 4.98 0.68 0.68
26 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products  -11.10 6.49 3.53 -0.59  0.59
27 Manufacture of basic metals  -8.45 8.28 5.22  -0.61  0.61
28 Manufacture of fabricated metal products, exc. mach. & equip. 1.91 6.65 7.16 0.10 0.10
29 Manufacture and repair of machinery and equipment  -1.03 1.60 1.49  -0.02  0.02
30 Manufacture of office, accounting and computing machinery  27.64 0.19 0.63 0.09 0.09
31 Manufacture and repair of electrical machinery and apparatus  -11.01 4.96 2.71 -0.45  0.45
32 Manufacture and repair of radio, TV & communication equip. & apparatus 9.60 0.21 0.33 0.02 0.02
33 Manufacture and repair of medical, precision & optical instruments, 
watches & clocks  15.43 0.19 0.38  0.04  0.04
34 Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers  -13.02 3.15 1.54 -0.32  0.32
35 Manufacture and repair of other transport equipment  -4.28 1.85 1.45  -0.08  0.08
36 Manufacture of furniture; manufacturing n.e.c.  13.63 1.89 3.50 0.32 0.32
37 Recycling  24.87 0.13 0.39 0.05 0.05
     3.82
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Table A.1 (contd.) 
Montenegro 










D Manufacturing  -6.30    
15 Manufacture of food products and beverages  -1.06 12.43 14.64  0.73  0.73
16 Manufacture of tobacco products -1.46 3.07 3.57  0.17  0.17
17 Manufacture of textiles  -4.92 5.21 5.44  0.08  0.08
18 Manufacture of wearing apparel; dressing and dyeing of fur  -25.41 4.46 2.25 -0.74  0.74
19 Tanning and dressing of leather; manufacture of related articles  7.26 1.99 2.98  0.33  0.33
20 Manufacture of wood and products of wood and cork  -8.71 9.99 9.24  -0.25  0.25
21 Manufacture of paper and paper products  -6.74 2.13 2.10  -0.01  0.01
22 Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media  2.31 4.30 5.59  0.43  0.43
23 Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products  10.25 0.16 0.26 0.03 0.03
24 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products  1.53 1.98 2.51 0.18 0.18
25 Manufacture of rubber and plastic products  0.20 1.03 1.26 0.08 0.08
26 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products  -4.24 2.68 2.86  0.06  0.06
27 Manufacture of basic metals -7.42 25.96 25.04  -0.31  0.31
28 Manufacture of fabricated metal products, exc. mach. & equip. -17.07 7.36 5.10 -0.75  0.75
29 Manufacture and repair of machinery and equipment  -11.16 9.48 8.08 -0.47  0.47
30 Manufacture of office, accounting and computing machinery  88.52 0.03 0.26 0.08 0.08
31 Manufacture and repair of electrical machinery and apparatus  7.62 0.86 1.31 0.15 0.15
32 Manufacture and repair of radio, TV & communication equip. & apparatus -15.51 0.61 0.45 -0.05  0.05
33 Manufacture and repair of medical, precision & optical instruments, 
watches & clocks  -9.14 0.09 0.08  0.00  0.00
34 Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers  -17.43 1.61 1.10 -0.17  0.17
35 Manufacture and repair of other transport equipment  -6.04 3.35 3.37  0.01  0.01
36 Manufacture of furniture; manufacturing n.e.c.  20.07 1.10 2.31 0.40 0.40
37 Recycling  10.06 0.12 0.20 0.03 0.03
      2.75
Serbia 










D Manufacturing  -7.16    
15 Manufacture of food products and beverages  -3.05 16.59 19.74  0.79  0.79
16 Manufacture of tobacco products -9.60 0.57 0.52  -0.01  0.01
17 Manufacture of textiles  -14.25 6.51 4.73 -0.44  0.44
18 Manufacture of wearing apparel; dressing and dyeing of fur  -14.77 8.51 6.05 -0.62  0.62
19 Tanning and dressing of leather; manufacture of related articles  -7.78 3.01 2.93  -0.02  0.02
20 Manufacture of wood and products of wood and cork  -7.70 2.82 2.75  -0.02  0.02
21 Manufacture of paper and paper products  -8.11 2.13 2.04  -0.02  0.02
22 Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media  -2.10 3.40 4.20  0.20  0.20
23 Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products  -4.22 0.87 0.99  0.03  0.03
24 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products  -7.09 6.27 6.29  0.00  0.00
25 Manufacture of rubber and plastic products  -2.33 3.70 4.54  0.21  0.21
26 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products  -8.24 6.31 6.02  -0.07  0.07
27 Manufacture of basic metals -10.55 5.91 5.09  -0.20  0.20
28 Manufacture of fabricated metal products, exc. mach. & equip. -9.43 7.83 7.09  -0.18  0.18
29 Manufacture and repair of machinery and equipment  -2.18 6.26 7.72  0.36  0.36
30 Manufacture of office, accounting and computing machinery  9.13 0.52 0.99 0.12 0.12
31 Manufacture and repair of electrical machinery and apparatus  -4.21 3.10 3.52  0.10  0.10
32 Manufacture and repair of radio, TV & communication equip. & apparatus -13.61 1.25 0.94 -0.08  0.08
33 Manufacture and repair of medical, precision & optical instruments, 
watches & clocks  -7.30 1.57 1.56 0.00 0.00
34 Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers  -8.71 5.91 5.53  -0.10  0.10
35 Manufacture and repair of other transport equipment  -6.03 2.15 2.26  0.03  0.03
36 Manufacture of furniture; manufacturing n.e.c.  -8.90 4.22 3.91  -0.08  0.08
37 Recycling  -6.13 0.57 0.59  0.01  0.01
     1.85
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Table A.2 
Growth rates of selected variables 
 
Nominal 







2001-2003       
Bulgaria  8.1 4.2 3.9 0.5 3.7 6.6 2.7 1.1
Romania 30.1  5.5  24.6 -4.4 9.8 28.3  3.7  6.1
Slovenia  10.3 3.5 6.7 -0.2 3.7 9.3 2.6 1.1
Albania  9.3 5.9 3.3 -4.8 10.7 11.8 8.5 2.3
Bosnia-Herzegovina  6.8        9.5    
Croatia  9.2 4.9 4.2 -0.4 5.3 4.8 0.6 4.7
Macedonia  2.9  -0.3 3.1 -0.3 0.0 3.5 0.4  -0.4
Montenegro 9.6  -1.0  10.6 -2.2 1.1 19.5  8.9  -7.8
Serbia  36.0  3.8 32.2 -1.9 5.7 49.2 16.9  -11.2
2004-2006       
Bulgaria  10.3 5.4 4.9 3.1 2.3 8.7 3.8  -1.5
Romania 18.4  6.4  11.9 0.3 6.1 18.2  6.3  -0.2
Slovenia  7.1 4.7 2.4 2.3 2.4 4.6 2.2 0.2
Albania  7.9 5.5 2.4 0.4 5.1 10.0 7.7  -2.5
Bosnia-Herzegovina 11.8  5.3  6.5 1.0 4.4 6.4  -0.1  4.5
Croatia  8.4 4.3 4.1 1.1 3.3 5.5 1.4 1.9
Macedonia  10.2 4.2 6.0 -2.5 6.6 11.0 5.0 1.6
Montenegro  7.0 2.9 4.1 1.5 1.4 4.8 0.7 0.7




Growth rates by broad sectors; peer countries, 2004-2006 
 
Nominal 







Bulgaria      
Agriculture           
Manufacturing 11.4  6.4  5.1 3.2 3.1 9.0 4.0  -0.8
Business services  11.3  8.9  2.4 8.0 0.9 11.1 8.7  -7.8
Other services  13.4  8.3  5.0 5.0 3.3 8.9 3.9  -0.5
Mining, Energy  10.9  -0.1  11.1 -1.3 1.2 8.3 -2.8  3.9
Public services  6.3  -0.6  6.9 0.1 -0.8 7.6 0.7  -1.4
Total 10.3  5.4  4.9 3.1 2.3 8.7 3.8  -1.5
           
Romania           
Agriculture 5.5  0.4  5.0 -4.9 5.3 16.4 11.4  -6.1
Manufacturing 19.4  5.6  13.8 -0.4 6.0 16.4 2.6  3.3
Business services  21.2  8.0  13.3 18.2 -10.3 16.9 3.6  -13.9
Other services  23.2  11.9  11.3 5.6 6.3 16.5 5.1  1.2
Mining, Energy  11.0  -2.1  13.1 -0.6 -1.5 18.1 5.1  -6.6
Public services  15.8  -1.8  17.6 0.1 -1.9 24.9 7.2  -9.1
Total 18.4  6.4  11.9 0.3 6.1 18.2 6.3  -0.2
           
Slovenia           
Agriculture 4.0  1.9  2.0 6.8 -4.9 4.4 2.3  -7.2
Manufacturing 4.5  5.1  -0.6 -0.1 5.2 5.9 6.5  -1.3
Business services  8.1  5.1  3.1 5.3 -0.2 4.1 1.0  -1.2
Other services  8.8  5.3  3.5 0.5 4.8 4.8 1.3  3.5
Mining, Energy  9.0  5.7  3.3 3.0 2.7 7.2 3.9  -1.2
Public services  6.6  3.3  3.3 5.1 -1.9 2.9 -0.3  -1.5


















Albania              
Agriculture 2.4  3.4 -1.0 0.5 2.9 15.2  16.2  -13.4
Manufacturing, Mining, 
Energy 11.6  7.6 4.0 2.7 4.9 13.5  9.4  -4.6
Other services  9.0  6.4 2.7 -4.5 10.9 12.9  10.2  0.7
Total 7.9  5.5 2.4 0.4 5.1 10.0  7.7  -2.5
      
Bosnia-Herzegovina     
Total 9.99  5.33 4.66 4.65 0.68 7.05  2.39  -1.71
      
Croatia      
Agriculture 16.4  9.1 7.3 -4.4 13.5 7.7  0.4  13.1
Manufacturing 10.0  4.6 5.4 1.0 3.6 5.8  0.4  3.2
Business services  10.6  3.7 6.9 7.1 -3.4 6.7  -0.2  -3.2
Other services  7.9  5.1 2.9 2.3 2.8 5.3  2.4  0.4
Mining, Energy  20.3  7.2 13.1 -7.4 14.5 6.5  -6.7  21.2
Public services  5.8  0.1 5.7 0.9 -0.8 4.0  -1.6  0.9
Total 8.4  4.3 4.1 1.1 3.3 5.5  1.4  1.9
      
Macedonia      
Agriculture 5.6  2.4 3.2 -1.6 3.9 1.4  -1.8  5.8
Manufacturing 7.8  1.3 6.5 -2.2 3.5 2.2  -4.3  7.8
Business services  11.1  3.2 7.9 5.8 -2.5 1.4  -6.4  3.9
Other services  9.4  5.2 4.2 4.1 1.1 4.5  0.3  0.8
Mining, Energy  -2.1  1.7 -3.8 3.1 -1.3 8.3  12.1  -13.4
Public services  6.0  2.1 3.9 3.1 -0.9 5.2  1.3  -2.2
Total 7.0  2.9 4.1 1.5 1.4 4.8  0.7  0.7
      
Montenegro      
Agriculture 5.8  3.4 2.4 -26.9 30.3 12.1  9.8  20.6
Manufacturing 7.3  5.1 2.3 -5.9 11.0 16.2  13.9  -2.9
Business services  11.7  2.0 9.7 -3.7 5.7 10.0  0.3  5.4
Other services  13.6  8.7 4.9 7.8 0.9 9.5  4.7  -3.7
Mining, Energy  0.3  0.3 -0.1 -12.9 13.3 18.0  18.1  -4.8
Public services  12.1  0.4 11.6 -7.3 7.8 8.4  -3.3  11.1
Total 10.2  4.2 6.0 -2.5 6.6 11.0  5.0  1.6
      
Serbia      
Agriculture 13.8  4.1 9.7 -13.2 17.3 22.7  13.0  4.3
Manufacturing 21.4  4.6 16.8 -3.1 7.6 22.9  6.1  1.5
Business services  18.4  5.3 13.1 -6.8 12.1 20.9  7.8  4.3
Other services  27.9  14.3 13.6 -2.7 16.9 22.1  8.5  8.4
Mining, Energy  22.6  2.6 20.0 5.6 -3.0 19.2  -0.7  -2.2
Public services  18.3  -0.6 18.9 -4.5 3.9 19.2  0.3  3.6




Trade deficit and current account, 2002-2007 
in % of GDP 
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Southeast Europe: an overview of economic fundamentals, 2007 
Croatia  Macedonia
  Albania     Bosnia and   Montenegro Serbia   NMS-10
1)  EU-15
  EU-27 
2) 
 
   Herzegovina        
     
 
GDP in EUR at exchange rates, EUR bn  37.50 5.55 7.95 10.71 2.42 29.67 839.5 11,418.2 12,272.7 
 
GDP in EUR at PPP, EUR bn  58.43 14.70 17.11 23.39 5.94 64.82 1414.8 10876.8 12272.7 
 
GDP in EUR at PPP, EU-27=100  0.5 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.05 0.5 11.5 88.6 100.0 
 
GDP in EUR at PPP, per capita  13160 7190 5432 6080 9500 8760 13840 27740 24860 
 
GDP in EUR at PPP per capita, EU-27=100  53 29 22 24 38 35 56 112 100 
 
GDP at constant prices, 1990=100  119.7 106.9 171.7 485.0
3)  . . 152.5 142.1 143.7 
 
GDP at constant prices, 2000=100  139.8 117.3 148.9 141.9 . 146.6 139.2 114.4 116.8 
 
Industrial production real, 1990=100  89.9 56.6 .. . . 161.8 129.0 132.9 
 
Industrial production real, 2000=100  140.0 107.2 176.1 172.0 115.5 115.9 156.4 112.5 117.5 
 
Population - thousands, average  4440 2045 3150 3846 625 7400 102101 392636 495943 
 
Employed persons - LFS, thousands, average  1600 590 935 850 217 2656 43552 174563 218648 
 
Unemployment rate - LFS, in %  10.0 34.9 14.0
4)  29.0 19.0 18.8 7.7 7.0 7.1 
 
General gov. expenditures, nat. def., in % of GDP  48.6 34.6
5)  29.0 42 27.2 42.6
6)  41.6
5)  46.1
5)  45.8 
5) 
General gov. revenues, nat. def., in % of GDP  46.3 35.3
5)  25.6 44 31.8 41.2
6)  39.6
5)  45.3
5)  44.9 
5) 
Price level, EU-27=100 (PPP/exch. rate)  64 38 46 46 41 46 59.3
  105.0
  100.0 
 
Average gross monthly wages, EUR at exchange rate 961 395
7)  277
8)  480 497 484
9)  839
7)  3304
7)  2821 
7) 
Average gross monthly wages, EUR at PPP  1497 1046
7)  596
8)  1048 1219 1057
9)  29.7
7)  117.1
7)  100.0 
7) 




















FDI stock per capita in EUR  6841 1200 727 1200 3556 1341 3716 . . 
 
NMS-10: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia. PPP: Purchasing power parity - wiiw estimates for Albania, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia. 
1) wiiw estimates. - 2) wiiw estimates, except: budget and compensation per employee. - 3) 1995 = 100. - 4) Employment and unemployment by registration, end of year. - 5) EU definition: 
expenditures and revenues according to ESA'95, excessive deficit procedure. - 6) Serbia: year 2004. - 7) Gross wages plus indirect labour costs, whole economy, national account concept. - 8) Public 
sector. - 9) Including various allowances. - 10) NMS-10, EU-15 and EU-27 data include flows within the region. 
Source: wiiw, AMECO, Eurostat. 113 
 
Table A.6 
Regression results with additional regressors: male (un-)employment  
Male working-age population
Dependent variable: 
employment rate coeff. (s.e.) coeff. (s.e.)
EPL - regular 2.9343 * (1.5479) 2.7100 * (1.5632)
EPL - temporary -2.4053 ** (0.9682) -1.8133 * (0.9887)
EPL - collective -0.7271 (1.2465) -0.2064 (1.2740)
rule of law 4.7805 (3.0028)
replacement rate -0.0532 (0.1018) -0.0649 (0.0926)
ALMP 1.1345 (3.4334) -0.4624 (3.8753)
union density 0.0013 (0.0607) -0.0330 (0.0680)
output gap 0.0336 (0.7419) 0.0256 (0.7752)
EU-15 -5.2893 (3.1194) -3.7074 (2.6922)
NMS -18.2481 *** (3.6031) -13.1143 *** (4.4981)
SEE -21.3779 *** (4.5442) -11.8803 (7.3517)
constant 81.8714 *** (4.7793) 74.2124 *** (8.0940)
adj. R²
Dependent variable: 
unemployment rate coeff. (s.e.) coeff. (s.e.) coeff. (s.e.)
EPL - regular -2.7841 * (1.4328) -2.6584 * (1.4774) -1.6135 (1.1864)
EPL - temporary 0.8593 (0.7118) 0.5277 (0.8333) -0.2810 (0.7472)
EPL - collective 0.3077 (0.9582) 0.0161 (1.0034) 0.2431 (0.9198)
rule of law -2.6777 (2.8769) -5.4923 ** (2.0785)
replacement rate 0.1154 (0.1240) 0.1219 (0.1307) 0.0940 (0.1238)
ALMP -1.7756 (2.3507) -0.8811 (2.5198) -0.6194 (2.1627)
union density -0.0028 (0.0387) 0.0165 (0.0454) 0.0342 (0.0456)
output gap -1.0592 (0.9577) -1.0547 (0.9916) -0.9911 (0.9123)
EU-15 2.3134 (2.3388) 1.4272 (2.2740)
NMS 9.4677 ** (3.5481) 6.5920 (4.4136)
SEE 16.0636 ** (6.7125) 10.7436 (8.0335) 3.4121 (5.8947)
constant 1.1863 (6.3705) 5.4764 (7.3848) 10.8176 (6.3521)
adj. R²
Note: 







Table A.7:  
Regression results with additional regressors: female (un-)employment  
Female working-age population
Dependent variable: 
employment rate coeff. (s.e.) coeff. (s.e.) coeff. (s.e.)
EPL - regular 3.0862 (1.9265) 2.6244 (1.8583) 1.3305 (1.5601)
EPL - temporary -4.0065 *** (1.4039) -2.7877 ** (1.2487) -1.7187 * (0.9458)
EPL - collective -0.6483 (1.4440) 0.4237 (0.9888) -0.3823 (0.8535)
rule of law 9.8420 *** (2.8490) 9.7583 *** (1.6062)
replacement rate 0.1133 (0.1036) 0.0893 (0.0901) 0.0885 (0.0908)
ALMP 7.3367 ** (2.8942) 4.0489 (2.7233) 3.5920 (2.2755)
union density 0.1505 *** (0.0466) 0.0798 * (0.0472) 0.1005 ** (0.0437)
output gap 0.8675 (1.0048) 0.8509 (0.8001) 0.5006 (0.8957)
EU-15 -12.1129 ** (4.5077) -8.8559 ** (3.6814) -7.5067 ** (2.6995)
NMS -14.8569 *** (3.4796) -4.2873 (5.1523)
SEE -17.8803 *** (5.9094) 1.6733 (8.1000)
constant 54.2328 *** (7.5365) 38.4643 *** (8.7331) 40.1819 *** (7.6674)
adj. R²
Dependent variable: 
unemployment rate coeff. (s.e.) coeff. (s.e.) coeff. (s.e.)
EPL - regular -2.8198 ** (1.3297) -2.6336 * (1.3635) -1.5672 (1.0604)
EPL - temporary 2.3376 ** (0.8915) 1.8462 * (0.9662) 1.3588 (0.8221)
EPL - collective 0.2478 (0.8423) -0.1845 (0.8555) 0.1385 (0.8885)
rule of law -3.9686 (2.6618) -6.3514 *** (1.9556)
replacement rate 0.0783 (0.1140) 0.0880 (0.1236) 0.0700 (0.1207)
ALMP -3.7421 * (2.1670) -2.4164 (1.9158) -1.3125 (1.6072)
union density -0.0354 (0.0342) -0.0069 (0.0397) 0.0101 (0.0422)
output gap -1.2253 (0.9553) -1.2187 (0.9835) -1.0289 (0.9241)
EU-15 4.4284 (2.7185) 3.1151 (2.5993)
NMS 10.2716 *** (3.5366) 6.0097 (4.5270)
SEE 14.8456 ** (6.0466) 6.9610 (6.9530) 0.0060 (5.1485)
constant 3.3045 (5.9871) 9.6628 (6.5534) 13.2366 ** (6.1094)
adj. R²
Note: 
***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, 10% respectively. Robust standard errors. 
0.56 0.57 0.58
0.73 0.81 0.81
 
 